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1 Introduction
Historically, state formation tended to be a tale of the aggregation of resources, power
and territory.1 Over the course of the last century, however, the world has witnessed a
persistent trend towards state fragmentation, raising the importance of understanding its
economic consequences. This is especially so since independence movements increasingly
embed their case in the economic realm (Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Gill, 2005). In the wake of the
Scottish independence referendum, for example, the Financial Times (2014) reports that
Alex Salmond, Scotlands first minister who is leading the campaign for inde-
pendence, said [...] that each household would receive an annual “independence
bonus” of £2,000 - or each individual £1,000 - within the next 15 years if the
country votes to leave the UK. The UK government, in contrast, claimed that
if Scots rejected independence each person would receive a “UK dividend of
£4,000 . . . for the next 20 years”.
In spite of its current poignancy, there is still surprisingly little empirical research
on the economic impact of secession and our knowledge on how independence processes
have affected economic trajectories of newly independent countries (NICs) remains highly
imperfect. In this light, this paper presents estimates of monetary per capita independence
gains/losses for a large panel of countries for the period covering 1950-2013.
There are at least three motivations for this exercise. First of all, the theoretical litera-
ture on the relation between state fragmentation, state size and economic growth delivers
contradictory results. Hence, it remains theoretically ambiguous whether and to what
extent a declaration of independence can be expected to meaningfully affect the economic
outlook of a NIC. Second, the empirical literature on this subject is disappointingly small
(Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Stermsˇek, 2015). This implies that it is also unclear what can be
learned from past instances of state fragmentation. Finally, the expected economic impact
of secession does shape people’s views on the merits of independence today, and thus also
shapes electoral behavior.2 Getting a clearer view on the actual economic consequences
of secession should serve to yield a more efficient democratic decision-making process.
In order to provide a preliminary view on the existence as well as the magnitude
of the independence dividend, Figure 1a presents difference-in-difference estimates of the
impact of declaring independence on the relative economic performance of NICs, where the
‘relative economic performance’ of a country is here defined as the percentage discrepancy
between its own and worldwide per capita GDP. More specifically, the figure plots the
relative economic performance of NICs ten years after their declaration of independence
against their relative economic performance ten years prior to independence. The vertical
1See, for instance, Tilly (1990) and Lake and O’Mahony (2004).
2Curtice (2013), for instance, reports opinion research results indicating that 52% of Scots would support
independence if it were clear beforehand that this would make them £500 a year better off, but that
support for independence drops to 15% if this decision is anticipated to come at a yearly cost of £500.
1
distance of each point on the graph to the ray of equality reflects a difference-in-difference
estimate for the net gain of independence pertaining to a specific NIC. As can be seen,
the figure provides tentative evidence that the decision to declare independence did affect
the relative economic performance of most NICs, and sometimes substantially so. Also
apparent is the heterogeneity of this effect across countries, where some NICs outperformed
the rest of the world in terms of per capita GDP growth during this period whereas
others seemingly incurred an independence cost. Nevertheless, the aggregate difference-
in-difference estimate of -.08 suggests that the net gain of independence tended to be
negative and lowered per capita income by 8%, 10 years after independence.
Figure 1: Trends in per capita GDP around a declaration of independence
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Note: Figure 1a plots the relative economic performance of each NIC in the 10th post-independence year against
its relative economic performance in the 10th pre-independence year. Figure 1b plots average per capita GDP
growth in the group of NICs, in a period stretching from 10 years before up until 10 years after their declaration of
independence. The number of years before (-) or after (+) secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
The crude correlation in Figure 1a, however, could also be driven by other omitted fac-
tors. Indeed, several challenges complicate the estimation of the causal impact of declaring
independence on economic outcomes emanating from omitted variable bias, simultaneity,
anticipation effects, effect heterogeneity and model uncertainty. First, as shown in figure
1a, NICs and established countries differ quite extensively in terms of their underlying
socio-economic structure. More specifically, the figure suggests that the group of NICs
is predominantly composed of economically less developed regions.3 Therefore, a simple
comparison of the economic performance of NICs vis-a´-vis established states may not only
reflect the effect of declaring independence, but also the effect of pre-independence differ-
ences in terms of economic growth determinants. Second, as illustrated in figure 1b, NICs,
in the run-up to their declaration of independence, are typically confronted with a sharp
decline in per capita GDP growth rates. As per capita GDP trajectories tend to be highly
persistent, this raises an obvious endogeneity concern. In other words, it is important to
3Table 1 provides a more detailed account.
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distinguish the causal impact of declaring independence on future growth potential, ruling
out any feedback-effects past growth dynamics might have on the contemporary incen-
tive to secede. Third, this pre-secession growth-dip is also consistent with the presence
of anticipation effects, indicating that state fragmentation may already have an economic
impact in the years prior to the actual decision to secede. Failure to account for these
ex ante effects will generally result in an underestimation of the full economic impact of
secession. Fourth, the economic impact of declaring independence might differ both across
countries and across time, such that an aggregate independence dividend estimate may
be sensitive to the chosen time horizon and country sample. Finally, the lack of conver-
gence on the functional form capturing the economic impact of declaring independence in
the theoretical literature raises concerns with respect to the sensitivity of the estimated
parameters to specific functional form assumptions.
To mitigate these concerns, this paper develops a semi-parametric estimation strategy
rooted in the synthetic control method pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). This
methodology allows to simulate, for each NIC, the counterfactual post-independence per
capita GDP trajectory that would be observed, in the hypothetical case that it would
have decided not to declare independence. By comparing these simulated trajectories
with their observed counterparts, we are able to track both country-specific and aggre-
gate independence dividends over time. Our central results show robust and statistically
significant evidence that the decision to secede lowered per capita GDP trajectories in
NICs, and persistently so. The baseline estimates of the aggregate long-run welfare cost
of independence, in terms of per capita GDP foregone, range from 20.5% to 46.4%. Yet,
there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity in the economic impact of secession.4
To address a well-known drawback of this methodology, namely the difficulty of as-
sessing the statistical significance of the estimates, we extend the placebo test approach
put forward by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2007, 2010, 2014) to propose a novel
triple-difference procedure to assess the reliability of the results. Most reassuringly, we
find little effect on per capita GDP when applying the simulation procedure on coun-
tries unaffected by state fragmentation, while the negative per capita GDP discrepancy
between NICs and their counterfactuals in the post-independence period also clearly ex-
ceeds the discrepancy between both typically observed in the pre-independence period.
This underscores that our results are unlikely to be driven by simulation inaccuracy or
unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we show that not correcting for potential biases
stemming from simulation and matching quality tends to inflate both the estimated net
cost of independence as well as its persistence.
One additional methodological contribution concerns the development of a two-step
procedure to shed some light on the channels primarily driving the sign and the magnitude
of these independence payoffs. To do so, we regress the estimated independence payoffs
4To demonstrate that these findings appear to hold irrespective of the estimation procedure employed,
Appendix B follows a parametric approach to estimate the independence payoff, obtaining similar results.
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on a number of underlying characteristics and evaluate various potential channels: trade
openness, country size, macroeconomic uncertainty, the intensity of conflict and the level
of democracy. In addition to its importance in terms of policy implications, this set-
up provides a meaningful way to empirically evaluate the various claims laid out in the
existing literature. Doing so, we find tentative evidence that the cost of independence
increases in the degree of surface area loss, pointing to the presence of economies of
scale. These negative effects dissipate, however, when trade barriers fall or democratic
institutions improve. We fail to find clear-cut results with respect to the effect of state
size, macroeconomic uncertainty and the intensity of military conflict.
Our argument is closely related to existing economic thinking on the consequences of
state fragmentation, which can at least be traced back to the conference on the Economic
Consequences of the Size of Nations held by the International Economic Association in
1957, the proceedings of which were published in a compendium in 1960 (Robinson, 1960).
A persistent narrow focus on this related issue of country size, however, seemingly pre-
vented the ensuing literature to develop a more comprehensive approach to study the
economic impact of state-breakup. In addition, the relation between state size and eco-
nomic growth remains theoretically ambiguous. Thus, although country size is considered
growth-neutral in early neo-classical, closed-market growth models such as Solow (1956),
more recent work in growth theory includes either some form of agglomeration effect
(Krugman, 1991) or a scale effect (Romer, 1986; Barro & Sala-i Martin, 2004; Aghion
& Howitt, 2009), benefiting growth potential in larger states.5 Larger countries are also
thought to benefit from scale economies in the public sector, due to their ability to spread
the costs of public policy over a larger population (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998; Alesina &
Spolaore, 2003). Nevertheless, Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) and Ramondo and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010) contend that smaller countries can compensate the costs imposed
by the limited size of their domestic market by increased trade openness. Furthermore,
it has been frequently asserted that the free-rider problem is less disruptive of collective
action in smaller states, facilitating a more flexible and effective economic policy (Kuznets,
1960; Streeten, 1993; Armstrong & Read, 1995; Yarbrough & Yarbrough, 1998). Finally,
smaller countries may benefit from a more homogenous population, easing the accumula-
tion of social capital and generalized trust (Armstrong & Read, 1998).
Another related line of research emphasizes the negative effects implied by the policy
uncertainty and the fear of potential conflict arising from the decision to secede. Onour
(2013) develops a macroeconomic model to analyze the adverse effects on asset market
stability and government debt sustainability of a small open economy splitting up in two
independent parts. Other studies maintain that a high propensity of policy change may
reduce both investment and the speed of economic development by triggering domestic
and foreign investors to delay economic activity or exit the domestic economy by investing
5Jones (1999, p. 143), for instance, argues that in reviewing three classes of endogenous growth models
“the size of the economy affects either the long-run growth rate or the long-run level of per capita income.”.
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abroad (Gupta & Venieris, 1986; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1996) and inducing
purchasers of government bonds to require higher risk premiums, increasing the cost of
providing government (Somers & Vaillancourt, 2014).6
The political science literature, on the other hand, has emphasized that secession gen-
erally involves some degree of (military) conflict (Fearon, 1998; Spolaore, 2008), resulting
in human capital losses, reductions in investment and trade diversion, all of which are gen-
erally associated with lower levels of growth. Additionally, these costs may be persistent
as Fearon and Laitin (2003b) find that NICs face drastically increased odds of civil war
onset, possibly due to the loss of coercive backing from the mother country. Following
Murdoch and Sandler (2004), the impact of secession is thus expected to be codetermined
by the existence, intensity, duration and timing of conflict.
In examining the influence of colonial heritage on post-independence economic perfor-
mance, a different strand of the literature stresses the relevance of the initial conditions left
behind by the mother country (Acemoglu, Simon, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu & Robin-
son, 2009). Due to institutional persistence, moreover, colonial origin is argued to be at
the root of contemporary growth differentials in Latin America and Africa (Bertocchi &
Canova, 2002). In addition, the more recent transition economy literature points out that
the identity of neighboring countries may matter too in shaping incentives to implement
political and economic reform (Roland, 2002; Fidrmuc, 2003).7
One hitherto overlooked issue is the temporal coincidence of surges of secession and
surges of democracy (Spencer, 1998). Dahl, Gates, Hegre, and Strand (2013), for instance,
provide empirical evidence that the wavelike shape of the global democratization process
is (at least partially) explained by the wavelike shape of state entry, finding that NICs are
initially considerably more democratic compared to the rest of the world but are also more
susceptible to subsequent reversal. Although it is unclear whether secession operates as
a democratization tool or whether democracies are more liable to demands for autonomy,
this suggests that the effect of declaring independence is at least partially contingent on
ensuing democratization processes in NICs.8 The link between democracy and economic
development, however, is itself subject to an inconclusive academic literature.9
This study is also directly related to a relatively small empirical literature that has
attempted to uncover the link between state fragmentation and economic performance.
Sujan and Sujanova (1994) use a macroeconomic simulation model to estimate the short-
term economic impact of the Czechoslovakian dissolution into the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, concluding that the decision to separate reduced GDP by 2.2% in the Czech
Republic and by 5.7% in Slovakia. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) rely on a difference-in-
6Walker (1998) mentions that when the intensity to secede is large, a declaration of independence may
actually reduce policy uncertainty since this decision clarifies that the current government will collapse.
7A more comprehensive discussion of the economic impact of the demise of colonial rule in Africa and Latin
America is offered by Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson (2007) and Prados De La Escosura (2009).
8Conversely, these findings also suggest that the link between democracy and economic development may be
confounded by the economic impact of state fragmentation, an issue overlooked in the existing literature.
9Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno (2005) provide a summary of this literature.
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difference approach to establish, for a restricted number of former colonies, that there
may be substantial growth gains from the elimination of extractive institutions. Some´
(2013) relies on a synthetic control approach to demonstrate that former African colonies
that declared independence through wars suffer larger income losses than African colonies
that declared independence without conflict, at least in the short to medium run. Most
recently, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Stermsˇek (2015) use panel data on the constituent parts of
former Yugoslavia to estimate an independence dividend concluding that, once relevant
factors such as war are taken into account, there is no statistically significant relation
between achieving independence and economic performance while independence achieved
by conflict seriously dents growth prospects. Small sample size and conflicting results,
however, limit the extent to which these results can be extrapolated to other instances of
state fragmentation. Moreover, these models generally do not account for omitted variable
bias, simultaneity, anticipation effects and model uncertainty.
Other empirical studies have focused on estimating the economic effects of unification.
In a cross-country set-up, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) propose a three-stage least squares
approach to analyze the market size effect and the trade reduction effect of 123 hypothet-
ical pairwise mergers between neighboring countries concluding that full integration, on
average, would reduce annual growth by 0.11% while market integration would boost it by
an estimated 0.12%. Abadie et al. (2007, 2014) use the synthetic control method to tease
out the per capita economic payoff of the 1990 German reunification for West Germany,
concluding that actual 2003 West German per capita GDP levels are about 12% below
their potential level due to unification.
Finally, the link between country size and economic performance is scrutinized in a
number of empirical studies which “typically find that smaller country size is likely to be
associated with higher concentration of the production structure, higher trade openness,
higher commodity and geographic concentration of trade flows [and] larger government”
(Damijan, Damijan, & Parcero, 2013, p. 6). Whether country size affects growth remains
disputed, as some studies fail to find any significant relationship (Backus, Kehoe, & Kehoe,
1992; Milner & Westaway, 1993) while others report a significant negative relation with
either per capita GDP (Easterly & Kraay, 2000; Rose, 2006; Damijan et al., 2013) or
economic growth (Alouini & Hubert, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construc-
tion of the dataset, provides data sources and reports some descriptive statistics. Section
3 presents the results emanating from the semi-parametric route. This section also con-
tains a variety of robustness checks. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on the channels
through which secession affects economic growth potential. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and descriptive statistics
To shed light on the relation between declarations of independence and the ensuing per
capita GDP dynamics in newly formed states, we construct an annual panel comprising
196 countries and covering the period 1950-2013. In what follows, 80 of those countries
will be referred to as ‘established countries’, in the sense that these are countries that al-
ready gained independence before 1950. The remaining 116 countries will be called ‘newly
independent countries’ (NICs), reflecting that these countries declared independence any-
where between 1950 and 2013. To identify the year of independence of each country in
the sample, we primarily rely on and extend data on state entry as reported in Gleditsch
and Ward (1999). Table A5 provides a full list of all NICs and their year of independence.
Our dependent variable is the log of per capita GDP, which will proxy the economic
performance of these countries, while our choice of control variables is primarily rooted
in the growth literature. Depending on the specification, it includes the average years
of education, life expectancy and population density to capture differences in terms of
human capital and differential population effects. As it is argued to be a determinant
of both economic performance and state fragmentation, we include a measure of trade
openness.10 Similarly, given that democratization processes appear to be both related to
the decision to secede and (possibly) to economic outcomes, we also utilize a composite
index of democracy. Furthermore, as independence is rarely achieved without some form
of conflict, we include the number of war deaths as reported by Bethany and Gleditsch
(2005) to capture the adverse economic effects associated with the existence, intensity
and duration of military conflict.11 In addition, mimicking Gibler and Miller (2014a),
we define a ‘political instability’-dummy indicating whether a country experienced a two-
standard-deviation change in its democracy score during the previous observation year. To
control for the adverse effects of macroeconomic instability, we include dummy variables
indicating banking and debt crises from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).12
We draw on a wide variety of data sources to obtain a dataset that is as extensive as
possible. Capitalizing on prior work by Fearon and Laitin (2003a), to address the potential
issues of measurement error and misreporting of per capita GDP13, we depart from the real
per capita GDP information contained in The Madison Project (2013), we subsequently
maximally extend these estimates forward and backwards relying on the growth rate of real
per capita income provided by the World Bank (2015) and finally approximate remaining
missing observations by use of a third-order polynomial in (i) a country’s level of CO2
emissions (World Resources Institute, 2015; World Bank, 2015), (ii) a year dummy and
10 See, for instance, Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina et al. (2000) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
11We primarily rely on the ‘best estimates’ of each specific country-year number of battle deaths. In case
these are unavailable, we take the simple average of the lowest and highest estimates instead.
12To preserve a maximal amount of observations in the analysis, missing values are set to 0 in both indexes.
13For a discussion of data variability and consistentization issues across successive versions of the Penn
World Table, see Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou, and Subramanian (2013); for a discussion on the
reliability of pre-independence per capita income estimates of former Soviet states, see Fischer (1994).
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(iii) a region dummy. To make sure that our results are not driven by the data construction
procedure, we also construct an alternative index of real per capita GDP by aggregating per
capita GDP information from multiple data sources, though this did not affect any of our
conclusions.14 With regard to the alternative growth determinants, we generally rely on a
similar third-order polynomial approximation strategy to synthetize relevant information
contained in various data sources. Appendix A reports all relevant data sources for these
constructed variables, provides a more detailed description of the variable-specific data
manipulation procedure utilized and reports some diagnostics.
Table 1, then, reports the most important descriptive statistics separately for estab-
lished countries and (future) NICs while also assessing to what extent both groups sig-
nificantly differ from each other in terms of these underlying growth determinants. The
results confirm our prior findings: (future) NICs, on average, are significantly poorer in
per capita terms and they also tend to have a less educated population, a lower life ex-
pectancy and less democratic institutions. In addition they tend to be somewhat more
sensitive to military conflict and experience more instances of debt crises. As suggested
in the existing literature, however, they also tend to be less politically unstable and favor
a more liberal trade regime. All in all, these summary statistics thus suggest that NICs
manifest less favorable growth determinants when compared to more established states.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Established countries Newly independenent countries
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. P-value
GDP per capita 4999 9086.64 14225.64 6901 4011.41 5341.306 -5075.23*** 0.00
Population (millions) 5118 46.22 143.853 7222 8.34 19.888 -37.88*** 0.00
Population density 5118 265.84 1508.283 7222 128.29 432.939 -137.55*** 0.00
Years of schooling 4874 6.22 3.123 6318 4.98 3.217 -1.23*** 0.00
Life expectancy 4786 65.60 11.185 6836 57.92 12.053 -7.69*** 0.00
Openness 4667 0.58 .51 5098 0.84 .482 0.27*** 0.00
Battle deaths per capita 5118 0.00 .001 7222 0.00 .001 0.00* 0.09
Democracy 4937 15.65 14.194 4800 8.44 9.854 -7.21*** 0.00
Political instability 4937 0.00 .049 4800 0.00 .032 -0.00* 0.10
Banking crisis 3520 0.10 .302 960 0.10 .295 -0.01 0.59
Debt crisis 3520 0.11 .313 960 0.20 .399 0.09* 0.00
Note: Data construction and sources provided in section 2 and appendix A. Statistics for NICs include information pertaining
to the pre-independence period. The last column reports the p-value for the two-sided t-test that the two means are equal.
14As noted in Appendix A, baseline per capita GDP correlates strongly with the alternative estimates, at
0.99 for their 11214 common observations. Results based on these alternative per capita GDP estimates
are available from the authors on request.
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3 Semi-parametric estimation of the independence dividend
This section follows a semi-parametric route to identify the causal relation between decla-
rations of independence and ensuing per capita GDP dynamics in NICs. After outlining
the general estimation strategy, we first provide a motivating example. Subsequently, we
derive baseline estimates of both country-specific and aggregate independence payoffs. A
last subsection formulates an inferential framework to perform some robustness checks.
3.1 Estimation strategy
To mitigate both omitted variable bias, endogeneity and heterogeneity concerns and to
deal with the potential problem of model uncertainty, we rely on the synthetic control
method pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and further developed in Abadie et
al. (2007, 2010, 2014). In a nutshell, this method estimates the effect of a given policy
shock (in this case, declaring independence) by comparing the evolution of an outcome
variable of interest (in this case, log per capita GDP) for the affected country with the
evolution of the same variable for a so-called ‘synthetic control’ country. This synthetic
control country, then, is constructed as a weighted average of unaffected control countries
(in this case, all other independent countries which did not recently gain independence
themselves) that matches as closely as possible the country affected by the policy shock,
before the shock occurs, for a number of unaffected predictors of the outcome variable.
Intuitively, the trajectory of the outcome variable in the synthetic control country can
be understood to mimic what would have been the path of this variable in the affected
country, if the policy shock had never occurred.
To see why this works, suppose that in a sample containing J + 1 countries, indexed
by i = {1, . . . , J + 1}, observed over T time periods, indexed by t = {1950, . . . , T0, . . . , T},
country j decides to declare independence at time t = T0 and that we are interested in
determining the causal effect of this decision, if any, on its per capita GDP trajectory. To
do so, denote by yNjt the level of log per capita GDP that would be observed in country
j if it did not (yet) declare independence, and let yTjt denote the outcome that would be
observed if country j declared itself independent prior to time t + 1. Abstracting from
anticipation effects, the causal economic effect of declaring independence at time t ≥ T0
is defined as βjt = y
T
jt− yNjt .15 The observed outcome for each country i can be written as
yi,t = y
N
i,t + βi,tNICi,t (1)
where NICi,t is an independence dummy equal to 1 for each NIC in each year after it
gained independence and 0 otherwise while βi,t captures the economic impact of secession
of country i at time t.
15If anticipation effects are at play, T0 should be redefined to coincide with the first period these play a
role. We will come back to this.
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It follows that estimating the causal impact of country j’s declaration of indepen-
dence at time t, βˆjt, boils down to estimating the counterfactual, post-independence per
capita GDP trajectory that would be observed in that country if it had never declared
independence, yˆNj,t:
βˆj,t = yj,t − yˆNj,t , t ≥ T0 (2)
Although yNj,t remains unobserved for t ≥ T0, suppose we do know yNi,t to linearly depend
on a number of observed growth determinants in each country i. More specifically, suppose
we summarize the country-specific information on x observed growth determinants in a
(n × 1) vector of unaffected observed covariates denoted by Xi = [xi,1, . . . , xi,n], where
n ≤ Tx. Note that Xi may contain past or future values of the observed characteristics
as long as these are unaffected by country j’s decision to secede. In addition, assume
that we do not observe all the relevant characteristics determining yNj,t and denote by Zi
the (m × 1) vector collecting all of these, potentially time-varying, unobserved growth
determinants, where m ≤ (T0 − 1950). Note that Zi may also subsume a country fixed
effect. Finally, assume yNi,t is subject to year fixed effects, ηt, and a mean-zero transitory
shock, i,t. Summarizing, we assume y
N
j,t to be given by
yNj,t = θtXj + λtZj + ηt + j,t (3)
where θt and λt denote the (1 × n) and (1 × m) vectors of unknown, potentially time-
varying, population parameters associated with Xj and Zj respectively.
To simulate the counterfactual post-independence yNj,t-trajectory that would be ob-
served in NIC j in absence of state fragmentation, consider a linear combination of the
remaining J control countries defined by the weighting vector W∗ = [w∗1, . . . , w∗j−1, w
∗
j+1,
. . . , w∗J+1], in such a way that the following four conditions hold: (i) the resulting weighted
vector of unaffected observed characteristics,
∑J+1
i 6=j wiXi, exactly mirrors that of country
j, Xj , (ii) the pre-independence outcome path is identical in the seceding country an its
synthetic counterpart, (iii) control countries receiving positive weight were independent
themselves at the time of country j’s declaration of independence but (iv) none of them
declared independence themselves in the 10 years preceding country j’s declaration of
independence. Note that this last condition is imposed to ensure that the control group
itself is not contaminated by economic effects of secession and/or its anticipation stemming
from one of its component parts. Formally, assume there exists a W∗ such that:
Condition 1
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iXi = Xj ,
E [Xi|NICj,t] = E [Xi] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , J + 1} & ∀t ∈ T
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Condition 2
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,1950 = y
N
j,1950 , . . . ,
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,T0−1 = y
N
j,T0−1
Condition 3
∃t ∈ {T0 − 10, . . . , T} : NICi,t −NICi,t−1 = 1 ⇔ w∗i = 0
Observe that, by use of equation (3), the value of the outcome variable of this synthetic
control country can be written as
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,t = θt
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iXi + λt
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi + ηt +
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i i,t (4)
such that the discrepancy between the outcome path that would be observed in (future)
NIC j in absence of state fragmentation (equation 3) and that of its synthetic counterpart
(equation 4) satisfying conditions 1 through 3 is given by:
yNj,t −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,t = λt
(
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi
)
+
(
j,t −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i i,t
)
(5)
Note that this also holds in the pre-independence period and denote by YPi , λ
P and Pi
the
(
(T0 − 1950) × 1
)
vector, the
(
(T0 − 1950) ×m
)
matrix and the
(
(T0 − 1950) × 1
)
vector with the tth row equal to yNi,t, λt and i,t respectively. This implies that the pre-
independence discrepancy between NIC j’s (fully observed) yNj,t-trajectory and that of its
synthetic version can be written as:
Y Pj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i Y
P
i = λ
P
(
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi
)
+
(
Pj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i
)
(6)
or, equivalently:
λP
(
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi
)
=
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i − Pj (7)
Pre-multiplying both sides of equation (7) by the inverse of λP , (λP
′
λP )−1λP ′ , yields16
Zj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗iZi = (λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′(J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i − Pj
)
(8)
Finally, inserting this expression for Zj −
∑J+1
i 6=j w
∗
iZi in equation (5) yields an expres-
sion for the discrepancy between the (partly unobserved) full outcome path that would be
16Note that the assumption that m ≤ T0 − 1950 is made to ensure that λP is nonsingular and thus has a
well-defined inverse.
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observed in the seceding country, j, in absence of state fragmentation and the same (fully
observed) outcome path for its synthetic version, W∗:
yNj,t −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i y
N
i,t = λt(λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i 
P
i − λt(λP
′
λP )−1λP
′
Pj −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i (j,t − i,t) (9)
Abadie et al. (2010) prove that under standard conditions, if the number of preinter-
vention periods (T0-1950) is large relative to the scale of the transitory shocks (i,t), the
right-hand side of equation (9) will tend towards zero. This suggests using
βˆj,T0+s = yj,T0+s −
J+1∑
i 6=j
w∗i yi,T0+s (10)
as an estimator for the independence dividend of country j, s years after independence.
Note that the primary strength of the synthetic control method is the lack of conditions
imposed on the m unobserved characteristics, making it robust for the confounding effects
of time-varying unobserved characteristics at the country level as long as the number of
pretreatment periods is large and the pre-independence match is good. Moreover, note
that as long as the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, this estimator is robust to
endogeneity as well. For example, if secession partly happens as a reaction to falling per
capita GDP levels, by definition, the per capita GDP levels of the synthetic control country
match with those of the seceding country in the pre-independence period such that these
unfavorable past GDP dynamics should manifest their potential economic effects in the
synthetic control unit as well. In contrast to a panel regression framework, this method also
safeguards against flattening out useful variation in the economic impact of secession across
countries and time, by allowing the estimation of both country-specific and aggregate net
independence dividends over time. Finally, this method does not require formal modeling
nor estimation of any of the population parameters associated with the observed growth
determinants, θt, making it more robust against model uncertainty.
In practice, since there often does not exist a set of weights that exactly satisfies con-
ditions 1 through 3, standard practice is to construct the synthetic control such that these
conditions hold approximately. In the empirical exercise below, we do so by relying on the
nested optimalization algorithm developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003, Appendix
B), which defines the optimal weight vector W∗ such that each synthetic control country
minimizes the Root Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE) of pre-independence out-
comes (see equation (6)).17 We restrict the pretreatment period to maximally 10 years
prior to the declaration of independence for each NIC in the sample, discarding those
NICs lacking sufficient pretreatment information.18 Our choice of pretreatment character-
istics stems from the growth literature and includes population size, population density,
educational attainment, life expectancy, trade openness and per capita battle deaths.
17The synthetic control algorithm is implemented by Abadie et al.’s (2010) synth-command in Stata 13.1.
18Table A5 lists the NICs included in the synthetic control algorithm.
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3.2 A motivating example
To illustrate this methodology, consider the example of Ukraine, which declared itself
independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. To estimate what would have been the post-
independence per capita GDP trajectory of Ukraine in absence of secession, we rely on
the remaining 153 countries in our sample which were independent in 1991, but were not
confronted with state state fragmentation between 1981 and 1991, to construct a weighted
average country that best resembles Ukraine in the pre-independence period for a number
of growth predictors. As it turns out, the optimal set of weights constructs this synthetic
version of Ukraine as a weighted average of - in decreasing order of their corresponding
weights - Panama, Romania, the United States and South Korea, see table 2.
Table 2: Optimal weights for synthetic Ukraine
Country w∗
Panama .405
Romania .397
United States .103
Korea Republic .095
Table 3 below suggests that the synthetic version of Ukraine, in effect, provides a much
better comparison for pre-independence Ukraine than the global average of our sample.
As is apparent from the table, average pre-independence per capita GDP levels in Ukraine
are practically indistinguishable from their synthetic counterpart, in contrast to the con-
siderably higher levels witnessed in the rest of the world during this period. Moreover,
the synthetic version of Ukraine is also much more similar to the actual pre-independence
Ukraine in terms of population, population density, trade openness, educational attain-
ment, life expectancy and the number of battle deaths suffered.
Table 3: Predictor balance before secession (1981-1990)
Predictor Ukraine Synthetic Ukraine World
Per capita GDP 4357.760 4495.777 6608.467
log Population 17.745 16.293 15.175
Population density 84.317 84.253 216.558
Educational attainment 8.831 8.570 5.367
Health 70.048 70.994 62.988
Trade openness 1.019 .958 .721
Battle deaths (per 1000 heads) 0 .009 .107
Note: Growth predictors are average over the 1981-1990 period. The last column reports
averages computed over all independent countries.
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The central intuition behind the synthetic control method, then, is that the only
potentially economically meaningful difference between Ukraine and its synthetic ver-
sion post-1991 is that Ukraine declared independence whereas its synthetic version did
not. Therefore, to derive the economic significance of the Ukrainian declaration of inde-
pendence, we can compare the post-independence per capita GDP trajectories of now-
independent Ukraine and its synthetic version. To do so, the left panel of figure 2 below
plots the evolution of log per capita GDP in Ukraine (full line) as well as synthetic Ukraine
(dashed line) between 1960 and 2011. Note, first, that both series are practically indis-
tinguishable during the entire pre-independence period. Thus, even though this synthetic
version of Ukraine was constructed by only taking into account the last 10 years prior
to independence, it turns out to be well capable of assessing Ukranian per capita GDP
dynamics over the entire 1960-1990 period.19 Combined with the close fit obtained for the
pre-independence growth predictors in both groups, as reported in table 3, this suggests
that the proposed combination of other independent countries adequately reproduces the
economic situation in Ukraine in absence of state fragmentation.
The estimated economic effect of the Ukraine declaration of independence is given
by the difference between the actual and synthetic trajectories in the post-independence
period. For this reason, the right panel of figure 2 plots the yearly gaps in per capita GDP
between Ukraine and its synthetic counterpart for a period stretching from 30 years prior
up until 20 after Ukraine’s secession from the Soviet Union. Note that, since both series
are expressed in log form, the discrepancy between both reflects the percentage per capita
payoff of having declared independence.
Figure 2: Trends in per capita GDP: Ukraine versus synthetic Ukraine
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Note: The left figure plots the log per capita GDP trajectories in Ukraine (full line) and synthetic Ukraine (dashed
line) between 1961 and 2011; the right figure plots the discrepancy between both trajectories during the same period.
The Ukranian independence declaration is marked by the vertical red dashed line.
19Note also, however, that we see a slight diversion between both series even in the (immediate) pre-
independence period, suggesting the presence of anticipation effects in the two years preceding the
Ukrainian declaration of independence. To take these into account, as suggested by Abadie et al. (2010),
we redid the exercise redefining the timing of Ukrainian independence to have occurred three years prior
to the actual decision to secede. None of the results are qualitatively affected by this.
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The figure suggests that the Ukranian declaration of independence had an immediate
and increasingly adverse impact on per capita GDP levels in the first five years after se-
cession. After this initial negative payoff, however, our results indicate that Ukraine never
fully recovered in the ensuing 15 years but, on the contrary, consistently underperformed
vis-a´-vis its synthetic counterpart. This suggests that, at least in the Ukranian case, the
negative independence dividend is persistent. Moreover, the estimated long-run cost im-
plies that, 20 years after its declaration of independence, Ukrainian per capita GDP lies
around 78% below its potential level due to state fragmentation.
3.3 Baseline results
As explained in the previous section, a closer inspection of the Ukrainian case through
the lens of the synthetic control method suggests that the net payoff of independence
is large and negative. Nevertheless, Ukraine might be an outlier in terms of both the
immediate and persistent effects of declaring independence, limiting extrapolation poten-
tial. Therefore, subject to data availability, this subsection applies the synthetic control
method to each NIC in the sample and characterizes both country-specific and aggregate
independence dividends as well as their evolution over time.
Figure 3 displays several different versions of the results of this exercise. First, consider
the top-left panel which plots the results for each separate NIC in our sample for which
sufficient data are available. The gray lines represent the gaps in per capita GDP between
each NIC and its respective synthetic version (corresponding to the results displayed in
figure 2b) in the period stretching from 10 years before up until 30 years after their
declaration of independence. The superimposed black line depicts the yearly average gap
in the sample while the superimposed red line captures the average gap computed over
the entire pre- and the post-independence period respectively. Apparent from this figure
is the large cross-country heterogeneity in the economic impact of secession, which clearly
shows several examples of NICs appearing to have benefited in economic terms from having
declared independence.20
As the figure also indicates, the synthetic control method provides a reasonably good
fit for the (log) per capita GDP trajectories between NICs and their respective synthetic
counterparts in the pre-independence period. The average pre-independence RMSPE in
the full sample is about 0.105, which is quite small but does reflect that NICs already
underperformed somewhat relative to their synthetic counterparts in the pre-independence
period. More specifically, per capita GDP levels in NICs on average lie 0.5% below those
of their synthetic versions even in the last 10 years prior to their respective declarations of
independence. In the post-independence period, however, their under-performance clearly
worsens and the average percentage discrepancy increases to -19.6%. Interestingly, NICs
generally do not appear to recover in the longer run as the negative aggregate independence
20Country-specific results are reported in table A6.
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dividend equals -21.3% in the 30th post-independence year. In other words, when their
country celebrates its 30th birthday, inhabitants of NICs typically experience per capita
GDP levels which lie 21% below those of countries which, in all relevant aspects, most
closely resembled their own country’s economic situation just prior to its decision to secede.
Nevertheless, figure 3a also indicates that the synthetic control method fails to ad-
equately reproduce per capita GDP trajectories for some NICs in the pre-independence
period. Malawi, for instance, is the country with the worst pre-independence fit (RM-
SPE=0.33). Given its extraordinary low pre-independence per capita GDP trajectory, it
should come as no surprise that its growth path cannot be adequately approximated by
any linear combination of the available control countries. By extension, this complication
applies to all NICs with more extreme values in their pre-independence characteristics.
As the post-independence gaps of these poorly fitted cases may merely reflect differences
in their underlying economic characteristics, rather than actual independence dividends21,
figures 3b to 3d plot the results when the sample is progressively restricted to include only
the 50%, 20% and 10% best matched cases in terms of their pre-independence RMSPE. In
each of these trimmed samples, the synthetic control method provides an excellent fit (the
associated average RMSPE’s equal 0.05, 0.034 and 0.02 respectively). Sacrificing quantity
for quality, however, does not qualitatively affect our primary conclusions: each of these
figures suggests that NICs face immediate and increasing costs of secession in the first
5 years after they gain independence, while these costs also appear quite persistent and
reduce per capita GDP levels by anywhere between 32%-46% in the long run.
As there does not appear to be a consensus on the optimal cut-off of pre-independence
RMSPE to avoid biases stemming from poor-fit, the bottom figure utilizes a more data-
driven procedure to impose a threshold value (or caliper) defining the maximal allowed
RMSPE. More specifically, in the tradition of propensity-score matching, Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985) suggest using an optimal caliper of 0.25 times the standard deviation of the
linear propensity score. Adapting this to the present context, figure 3e imposes a caliper
amounting to 0.5 times the samplewide standard deviation in pre-independence RMSPE.
Once again, this results in an excellent pre-independence fit as suggested by the average
RMSPE, which now equals 0.024, while our primary conclusions remain robust.
21Since they are unlikely to even approximately satisfy conditions 1 through 3.
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Figure 3: Impact of secession in selected countries
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(b) 50% best matched cases
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(c) 25% best matched cases
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 d
ivi
de
nd
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
(d) 10% best matched cases
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 d
ivi
de
nd
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
(e) All cases within caliper
Note: Each gray line plots the yearly percentage gap between the per capita GDP trajectory of a specific
NIC and its synthetic counterpart around their declaration of independence. The black line depicts the
yearly average gaps; the red line displays the pre- and post-independence average gaps. The number
of years before (-) or after (+) independence are indicated on the horizontal axis. The top-left panel
contains all available cases, subsequent panels include only results of the 50, 25 and 10% best matched
cases in terms of their pre-independence RMSPE. The bottom figure includes only those cases for which
the pre-independence RMSPE falls within the data-driven caliper cut-off amounting to 0.5 times the
samplewide standard deviation in pre-independence RMSPE.
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3.4 Statistical inference
To gauge the significance of these estimates, we first check whether a causal interpreta-
tion is warranted by their distribution. Therefore, figure A3 plots the same sequence of
aggregate independence dividend estimates but now includes a 95% confidence interval.
Notice that the pre-independence per capita GDP discrepancy between NICs and their
synthetic counterparts in the full sample gradually erodes to become statistically indis-
tinguishable when trimming the sample according to goodness-of-fit. More importantly,
these graphs confirm the tendency of NICs to increasingly underperform vis-a´-vis their
synthetic counterparts in the entire post-independence period, irrespective of the selected
sample. The larger independence costs estimated in the smaller samples, where meaning-
ful pre-independence discrepancies between NICs and synthetic NICs are absent, suggest
that the full-sample results effectively underestimate the true economic impact of secession
by ignoring anticipation effects.
Additionally, recall that the synthetic control method critically hinges upon the close
similarity between countries in the pre-independence period to eliminate the potential
bias of unobserved heterogeneity.22This motivated a closer inspection of the results in
trimmed samples. As an alternative way to control for unobserved heterogeneity, one which
avoids imposing arbitrary cut-offs to exclude poor-fitting cases, we develop a difference-
in-difference estimator along the lines of Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2014) to assess
whether the per capita GDP discrepancy between NICs and synthetic NICs in any given
post-independence year statistically significantly exceeds its 10-yearly pre-independence
average value. Indeed, as NICs are unaffected by state fragmentation in the pre-independence
period by construction, the distribution of pre-independence per capita GDP discrepancies
between NICs and synthetic NICs is taken to approximate the sampling distribution of
the per capita GDP discrepancy between both emanating from their unobserved hetero-
geneity. In this sense, the significance of the actual independence dividend estimates can
be evaluated against their distribution in the pre-independence period.
Further illustrating the rationale for this inferential exercise, figure A4 plots the dis-
crepancy between Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine in the first post-independence year
against the distribution of per capita GDP discrepancies between both in the pre-independence
period. Clearly, the per capita GDP discrepancy between Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine
in the first post-independence year is unusually large compared to the distribution of
per capita GDP discrepancies observed between both in absence of state fragmentation.
The first-year independence dividend estimate is therefore unlikely to reflect unobserved
heterogeneity, but measures the economic impact of secession as intended.
To formalize this approach, we specify a trend difference-in-difference estimator in order
to obtain trend-demeaned estimates of the independence dividend. Intuitively, a causal
interpretation of our results would be problematic if these estimated trend-demeaned post-
22See equations (6) and (7).
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independence gaps, net of their average pre-independence discrepancy, did not significantly
differ from zero. Formally, denoting the weighting vector defining the synthetic counterpart
of NIC j by w∗ij = [w
∗
1j , . . . , w
∗
Ij ], we define the trend difference-in-difference estimate of
the economic independence dividend for NIC j, s years after it declared independence, as:
ˆβj,s
tDD
=
(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
−
(
T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yj,t −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,t
))
(11)
The resulting country-specific trend difference-in-difference independence dividend es-
timates are reported in table A6. Compared to the raw independence dividend estimates,
trend-demeaned estimates tend to be slightly lower in absolute value. Hence, not correct-
ing for the extent of observed pre-independence discrepancies tends to slightly inflate the
estimated net cost of independence. Nevertheless, trend-demeaned estimates are quanti-
tatively and qualitatively very similar to their raw counterparts and thus largely back the
story that emerged earlier. More specifically, a closer inspection of the results plotted in
figure A5 reveals that, irrespective of the time-horizon, roughly 60 to 70% of NICs suffered
economic costs of secession even after correcting for matching quality, while the remaining
20 to 30% appears to have benefited from becoming independent. This also underscores
the high persistence in the estimated independence dividend trajectories, implying that
adversely affected NICs generally show little sign of recovery in the longer run.
Note, however, that the confidence intervals plotted in figures A3 and A5 only express
the degree of uncertainty associated with the magnitude of the estimated gaps, either
across NICs or relative to the pre-independence period. One additional source of uncer-
tainty concerns their reliability, which critically hinges on the extent to which synthetic
control countries adequately reproduce the counter-factual per capita GDP trajectories
NICs would have experienced in absence of state fragmentation. Indeed, to the extent
that they do not, estimated independence dividends may not only be attributed to the
decision to secede but also to poor simulation quality.23 To study the robustness of the
results in this regard, we depart from the placebo test approach developed by Abadie et al.
(2010) to quantify the probability of obtaining estimates of this magnitude by pure chance.
To do so, we reapply the synthetic control method to each potential control country in a
particular NICs’ donor pool.24 As the countries involved in this exercise are unaffected by
state breakup by construction, the resulting distribution of ‘placebo’ dividends is taken to
approximate the sampling distribution of the independence dividend estimate under the
hypothesis of a zero effect. In this light, the significance of actual independence dividend
estimates can be evaluated against their corresponding distribution of placebo gaps.
Once again reconsidering the Ukrainian example, figure A6 plots the actual Ukrainian
independence dividends against the distribution of placebo gaps, resulting from an ap-
23In terms of our model, poor simulation quality primarily originates from differing transitory shocks or,
equivalently, cross-country residual variability, see equation (9).
24Eliminating observations pertaining to the NIC itself in the process, to avoid contamination effects.
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plication of the synthetic control algorithm to each of its 153 potential control countries.
Clearly, the estimated independence dividend trajectory for Ukraine lies well outside the
distribution of placebo gaps, suggesting that it is unusually negative under the null hy-
pothesis of a zero effect. This is especially so if we restrict attention to the best-matched
potential control countries, by imposing a caliper equal to the RMSPE attained by syn-
thetic Ukraine. All of this indicates that the Ukranian independence dividend trajectory
is not likely to be driven by simulation inaccuracy, but reflects the economic impact of
secession as intended.
Figure A7 suggests that this conclusion also holds for the full sample, by plotting the
full-sample distribution of actual independence dividend estimates against those of their
placebo counterparts in the 40-year period surrounding a declaration of independence. Al-
though placebo countries tend to under-perform somewhat vis-a´-vis their synthetic coun-
terparts as well, their per capita GDP trajectories track each other much more closely,
especially in the short- to medium run. Moreover, in stark contrast to NICs, per capita
GDP discrepancies in the placebo group typically do not react strongly, if at all, when
their corresponding NIC declares its independence. This underlines the capacity of the
synthetic control algorithm to approximate the economic behavior of countries in absence
of state fragmentation, especially apparent in the best-matched cases, thereby bolstering
the reliability of our prior findings.
To formalize this approach, we specify a placebo difference-in-difference estimator in
order to obtain placebo-demeaned estimates of the independence dividend. Intuitively,
a causal interpretation of our results would seem unwarranted if artificially reassigning
the decision to secede to countries unaffected by processes of state fragmentation would
yield placebo dividend estimates similar or larger in absolute value. Formally, indexing
the control countries in NIC j’s donor pool by k ∈ [1, . . . ,KJ ], we define the placebo
difference-in-difference estimate of the independence dividend of NIC j, s years after it
declared independence, as:
ˆβj,s
pDD
=
(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
− 1
Kj
Kj∑
k 6=j
((
yk,T0+s −
∑
i 6=k,i6=j
w∗i,kyi,T0+s
))
(12)
Country-specific placebo difference-in-difference independence dividend estimates are
reported in table A6 and plotted in figure A8. Correcting the magnitude of the synthetic
control estimates for discrepancies that can reasonably attributed to poor simulation qual-
ity results in estimates lower in absolute value suggesting, once again, that our baseline
results slightly overestimate the true independence cost. Consequently, figure A8 illus-
trates that only 50% of the NICs in the sample appears to have suffered adverse long-run
consequences from becoming independent, while close to 40% of them appear to have
benefited in economic terms from having done so.
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Fourthly, to mitigate potential biases emanating from either unobserved heterogeneity
between NICs and synthetic NICs or simulation inaccuracies in the counterfactual per
capita GDP trajectories, or a combination of both, we consider removing both the 10-
yearly average pre-independence discrepancy as well as the contemporary average discrep-
ancy observed in the placebo group from the estimated independence dividend. Intuitively,
a causal interpretation of our results would seem premature if the change in the relative
performance of NICs versus synthetic NICs, after they have declared independence, would
have the same direction and magnitude as the relative performance deviation typically ob-
served in placebo countries. Formally, we propose the following triple-difference estimator
of the economic impact of secession in NIC j, s years after secession:
βˆDDDj,s =
[(
yj,T0+s −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,T0+s
)
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yj,t −
∑
i 6=j
w∗i,jyi,t
))]
−
1
Kj
Kj∑
k 6=j
[(
yk,T0+s −
∑
i 6=k,i6=j
w∗i,kyi,T0+s
)
−
( T0−1∑
t=T0−10
(
yk,t −
∑
i 6=k
w∗i,kyi,t
))] (13)
The resulting country-specific triple-difference estimates of the post-independence in-
dependence dividends are reported in table A6 and plotted in figure A9. Unsurprisingly,
compared to their uncorrected counterparts, triple-difference estimates of the indepen-
dence dividend also tend to be lower in absolute value. That being said, a look at figure
A9 reveals that correcting for matching as well as simulation quality does not qualitatively
affect our previous inferential conclusions. In tandem with our previous results, our esti-
mates thus indicate that declaring independence tends to be costly since over 50% of the
countries in the sample experienced a negative payoff of independence, 30 years after they
became independent, whereas only 35% experienced a net independence gain.
Finally, to get a sense of the general implications of these various inferential exercises,
figure 4 provides an overview of the various aggregate independence dividend estimates
by plotting the synthetic control estimates (hollow dots), trend difference-in-difference
(triangles), placebo difference-in-difference (diamonds) and triple-difference (squares) in-
dependence dividend estimates for each year in the 30-year period following state frag-
mentation, along with their 95% confidence intervals. As noted, correcting for potential
biases stemming from matching and simulation quality generally reduces these aggregate
negative independence dividend estimates. Nevertheless, the figure suggests that the raw
independence dividend estimates are more sensitive to simulation inaccuracies than to
unobserved heterogeneity, as correcting for the magnitude of the placebo independence
dividend typically leads to the most pronounced upward correction. In conclusion, our
most conservative triple-difference estimates, which eliminate any discrepancy between
NICs and synthetic NICs potentially driven by unobserved heterogeneity or poor simu-
lation quality, confirm that there is a clear pattern of negative independence dividends
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in the full sample, at least in the short- to medium run. In the long run, however, this
clear pattern largely dissipates as a result of increasing cross-country heterogeneity in the
estimated triple-differenced independence dividends.25
Figure 4: Semi-parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession
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Note: The figure plots the yearly average uncorrected synthetic control estimates of the in-
dependence dividend (hollow dots), as defined in equation (10), against the corresponding
trend difference-in-difference (triangles), placebo difference-in-difference (diamonds) and triple-
difference (squares) estimates related to equations (11), (12) and (13), along with their 95%
confidence intervals. The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
3.5 Selected results
To put more empirical flesh on the bones, this section supplements the large-scale econo-
metric analysis by highlighting the results pertaining to a number of historical instances
of state fragmentation. More specifically, figure 5 characterizes the dynamics of the eco-
nomic consequences associated with the disintegration of the Belgian, British, French and
Portuguese colonial empires, comparing these with the implied economic effects stemming
from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and, most recently, Czechoslovakia.
Recall that the identity of the mother country is thought to play an important role in
explaining cross-country heterogeneity in independence dividend trajectories, see section
1. In this regard, it is often argued that former British colonies prospered relative to their
French, Spanish, Portuguese and Belgian counterparts because the British left behind
25Since these estimators ignore the potential presence of anticipation effects, they are likely to yield a lower
bound for the true economic cost of state fragmentation.
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better institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009) and were more
successful in educating their dependents (Grier, 1999). Interestingly, our results largely
back this story and suggest that, in sharp contrast to NICs with other colonial heritages,
former British colonies tended to experience a small independence gain in the medium run,
amounting to around 10% in per capita GDP terms in the 10th post-independence year.
More surprisingly, although Belgian and Portuguese dominations are often considered the
most detrimental and exploitative (Bertocchi & Canova, 2002), former French colonies
appear to have suffered the most adverse economic consequences of colonial demise in the
form of a persistent 20% reduction in per capita GDP. While - in the aggregate - Portuguese
colonies seem largely unaffected by their decision to go it alone, former Belgian colonies
and protectorates do appear to have suffered a short-run cost of independence but were
able to revert this to a positive long-run independence dividend. The latter suggests that
there may be economic gains associated with the elimination of colonial drain.
In the same vein, Roland (2002), Svejnar (2002) and Fidrmuc (2003) maintain that the
extent of state capture and rent-seeking was more pervasive in the Soviet Union than in
other Eastern and Central European countries and that these differential initial conditions,
often proxied by the distance from Western Europe, go a long way in explaining the under-
performance of former Soviet states vis-a´-vis other NICs in the region. Furthermore,
they argue that this mechanism may have been amplified by differential prospects of
European membership, which enhanced incentives for patterns of law enforcement and
protection of property rights in potential member states. Our results are testimony to this,
as former Soviet members clearly suffered more adverse economic consequences of secession
in comparison to Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian successor states. More specifically, our
results indicate that the group of former Soviet members suffered the most adverse and
persistent effects of state breakup which, at their peak, amounted to a staggering 80% cut
in per capita GDP and which only evaporated 20 years after independence. In comparison,
the economic costs associated with the Czechoslovakian ‘Velvet Divorce’ were both more
modest and much less persistent while the post-independence performance of the successor
states that emerged from the demise of Yugoslavia, if anything, looks even more rosy.
All in all, we consider the fact that our estimation results do not considerably diverge
from the prior qualitative findings in the existing literature as an additional indication of
their reliability and validity.
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Figure 5: Triple-difference estimates: historical instances of state fragmentation
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Note: The figures plot yearly, triple-difference estimates of the independence dividend trajectories associated with selected
historical instances of state fragmentation. Each gray line plots the trajectory of a specific former member state; the black
lines depict the aggregate independence dividend trajectory; the dashed lines depict the 90% bootstrapped confidence interval,
clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications. The number of years before (-) or after (+) independence are
indicated on the horizontal axis.
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4 Two-step estimates of the determinants of the indepen-
dence dividend
So far, our findings suggest that the independence dividend tends to be substantial, neg-
ative and fairly persistent. Yet, there also is considerable heterogeneity in the economic
impact of secession across countries and time. From a policy perspective, one lingering
issue concerns understanding the economic channels through which secessionist processes
affect growth potential in NICs. This extension builds on prior results to propose a two-
step approach to shed some light on the primary economic channels determining both the
sign as well as the magnitude of country-specific independence payoffs. After outlining the
estimation strategy, we present the baseline results and discuss some robustness checks.
4.1 Estimation strategy
To evaluate the various channels through which the decision to secede might affect per
capita GDP trajectories in newly formed states, we refine the methodology put forward
by Campos et al. (2014) and regress the semi-parametric independence dividend estimates
on several potential determinants. Doing so, we limit our attention to the first 30 years
following a declaration of independence and consider the potential channels most com-
monly cited in the theoretical literature, see section 1: the presence of (dis)economies of
scale, as proxied by state size (in square kilometers), the extent of surface area loss and
trade openness; the impact of persistent conflict, as captured by the per capita number
of battle deaths; the relevance of ongoing processes of democratization, incarnated in an
index of democracy; and the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty, as reflected in a dummy
variable indicating episodes of debt and/or banking crises.
In determining the relative importance of these potential determinants, one obvious
difficulty is that the interpretation of the regression coefficients is sensitive to the scale
of the inputs. Therefore, all continuous predictor variables are standardized to convert
them to a common scale.26,27 Another complication stems from the possibility that the
independence dividend trajectories themselves, as well as their relation to their underlying
determinants, may change over time.28 To capture these dynamics, we include dummies for
each post-independence year as well as their interaction with all other predictor variables.
Finally, to take into account that global patterns in trade liberalization may have gradually
reduced the economic cost of secession10, in addition to region dummies, all specifications
also include (calendar) year dummies to capture region as well as year fixed effects.
More specifically, denoting the estimated net gain of independence of NIC i located in
26Dummy variables remain unchanged since their coefficients can already be interpreted directly.
27As noted by Schielzeth (2010), there has been some controversy about this approach to measure the
relative importance of predictor variables since there is no unique way to partition the variation in the
dependent variable when predictor variables are correlated. Firth (1998) provides a more comprehensive
overview of the relevant literature.
28Our prior results, for instance, suggest that the adverse effects of independence tend to erode over time.
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region r pertaining to the sth post-independence year, which coincides with calendar year
t, by βˆi,r,t,s, we estimate the following model:
βˆi,r,t,s = λXi,r,t,s + λs
(
Xi,r,t,s × s
)
+ ηs + δr + µt + i,r,t,s (14)
where Xi,r,t,s denotes the (1 ×X) vector of standardized predictors of the independence
dividend;
(
Xi,r,t,s×s
)
denotes their interaction with the S years-of-independence dummy,
which allows for a differential relation in each post-independence year; ηs captures the S
years-of-independence fixed effects; δr denotes the R region fixed effects; µt contains the
T year fixed effects; and the error term, i,r,t,s, collects all random, transitory shocks to
the independence dividend.
Note that, in the current set-up, the coefficients collected in λ and λs reflect the
standard deviation elasticity of the independence dividend with respect to its predictors
in the sth post-independence year, such that larger coefficients are taken to identify more
influential predictors. In this light, it makes sense to define the relative importance of each
predictor x ∈ X in a given post-independence year s, ∆x,s, as the expected percentage
change in the independence dividend associated with its standard deviation increase:
∆x,s =
∂βˆi,r,t,s
∂x
= λˆx + λˆs,x (15)
where λˆx and λˆs,x refer to the parameter estimates associated with the x
th predictor in
the vector of standardized predictors in equation 14. As noted by Gelman and Pardoe
(2007), if one is willing to consider the X included predictors causally, ∆x,s corresponds
to an expected causal effect under a counterfactual assumption.
4.2 Baseline results
Figure 6, then, provides the results of an investigation of the economic channels influencing
the most conservative triple-difference estimates of the independence dividend. More
specifically, the black lines plot the evolution of the relative importance of these potential
determinants along with their 90% confidence intervals, while the red dotted lines indicate
the yearly average values of these standardized predictors actually observed in our sample.
Several explanations to account for the observed variation in the estimated net gains
of secession are confirmed. First, our results indicate that the adverse effect of declaring
independence is increasing in the extent of surface area loss, at least in the short to medium
run. In line with the endogenous growth literature, these results are thus consistent with
the hypothesis that separation from larger-sized entities entails more pronounced adverse
effects due to a larger reduction in scale economies. We obtain positive estimates for the
effect of trade openness throughout the period under consideration, corroborating previous
theoretical findings which suggest that trade openness counteracts the adverse effects of
decreased domestic market size. Note that, by this reasoning, the negative trade shock
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typically observed in the immediate post-independence period (indicated by the red line
in figure 6c) is expected to aggravate the short-run effect of independence on economic
performance and may co-explain the typical post-independence dip in per capita GDP
also visible in figure 4. Finally, we fail to discern a meaningful effect of state size since
smaller-sized NICs do not appear to be outperformed by their larger-sized counterparts.
Second, although the point estimates indicate that it is negatively related to the inde-
pendence dividend, the effect of military conflict cannot be precisely estimated and, hence,
the intensity of military violence does not seem meaningfully related to the magnitude of
the independence dividend. More interesting is that our results are consistent with de-
mocratization being a second channel through which newly formed states can reduce the
adverse effects of secession. Compared to the beneficial effect of opening up to trade, how-
ever, our results indicate that the impact of the democratization process is only visible in
the longer run while its relative importance tends to be more modest. Note that the fact
that NICs tend to regress to more authoritarian rule in the immediate post-independence
period potentially contributes to more pronounced short-run independence costs. Finally,
we also find tentative evidence that the adverse effects of declaring independence may
be severely aggravated when these decisions are followed by instances of sovereign debt
default or banking crises, although the coefficients tend to be imprecisely estimated.
It may be useful to compare these standard deviation elasticities with the region, year
and years-of-independence fixed effects. Doing so, figure 6g is indicative of a small amount
of regional heterogeneity in the economic impact of secession: Sub Saharan NICs appear
to have benefited the most from their declaration of independence while North African
NICs suffered the worst effects. In contrast to the existing literature, we find no evidence
of global trade liberalization gradually lowering the economic costs of independence. Quite
the contrary, our results indicate that declaring independence became more costly over
time, reducing per capita independence dividends by approximately 20% in 2013 in com-
parison to 1980. Finally, the last figure shows that independence dividends, all else equal,
tend to worsen in the short to medium run but do not erode in the longer run.
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Figure 6: Determinants of the triple-differenced independence dividend
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Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the triple-differenced independence
dividend (black line) against their sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are
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4.3 Robustness checks
As a first robustness check, we consider the sensitivity of our estimates with respect to
the specific first-step estimation procedure, by sequentially replacing the triple-differenced
independence dividend with its raw, trend- and placebo-demeaned counterpart, see figures
A10 through A12. Doing so, however, we obtain broadly similar results. Therefore,
our prior conclusions hold irrespective of the first-step estimation procedure utilized to
estimate the independence dividend.
In figure A13, we display the results of adding educational attainment, life expectancy
and the level of per capita GDP as control variables. While the former serve to control
for the potential effects of human capital differences between NICs, the latter addition
allows us to verify whether the impact of secession differs in the degree of economic devel-
opment. As can be seen, the effect of human capital remains somewhat elusive while we
find tentative evidence that richer regions experience less pronounced independence costs.
Nevertheless, adding these controls does little to affect our prior conclusions.
In a next step, we extend the original model and also include pre-independence RM-
SPE and the absolute value of the average contemporary placebo independence dividend
to control for matching and simulation quality, see figure A14. Although we find some
evidence that simulation inaccuracies cloud the short-run triple-difference estimates, when
large inaccuracies in the placebo group coincide with more negative independence divi-
dend estimates, it also turns out that our prior conclusions are not sensitive to explicitly
controlling for simulation and matching quality in our estimation model.
Finally, notice that we can also estimate a more restrictive model that eliminates all the
- potentially confounding - variation in time-invariant covariates. Figure A15, therefore,
re-estimates the original model but now includes country instead of region fixed effects.
Unsurprisingly, this manipulation causes the relative importance of our time-constant
predictors to be less precisely estimated. However, the beneficial effect of increased trade
openness and democratization remains visible in this model.
All in all, while the second-step results are less clear-cut than our first-step findings,
they suggest that the post-independence per capita GDP dip observed in our sample is
initially mainly driven by decreasing scale economies and trade flows and a short-term re-
gression towards more authoritarian institutions, while the longer-run cost may be brought
about by increased costs of macroeconomic uncertainty. Nevertheless, increased trade
openness and ongoing processes of democratization appear to have bolstered growth po-
tential in these newly formed states, mitigating - at least partially - independence costs.
Although this strategy does not allow for a conclusive identification and ranking of all
the channels influencing the independence payoff, due to the unresolved issues of omitted
variable bias and endogeneity, the consistent patterns of variation in the independence
payoffs certainly make these channels prime candidates for further research.
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5 Conclusion
In tandem with the recent surge in secessionist tendencies, independence movements from
all over the world increasingly tend to defend their cause based on economic considerations.
However, whether or not there are economic benefits from declaring independence remains
largely unexplored. This study is the first of its kind to examine the economic impact of
secession for a broad sample of newly independent countries, focusing on a large time
period covering the years 1950 to 2013.
Relying on a semi-parametric estimation strategy to control for the confounding ef-
fects of past GDP dynamics, anticipation effects, unobserved heterogeneity between newly
formed and more established states, model uncertainty as well as heterogeneity, we present
robust evidence that secession statistically significantly hampers growth potential in newly
formed states. More specifically, our central results suggest that the decision to secede
slashed per capita GDP in NICs anywhere between 20% and 46% in the long run. From
a methodological perspective, to demonstrate the stability of the results, we develop a
novel triple-difference procedure to provide informative statistical inference on the reli-
ability of synthetic control estimates of treatment effects. Applying this procedure, we
confirm the existence of a negative independence dividend in the short to medium run,
with cross-country heterogeneity obscuring the average long-run impact of independence.
Another novelty is the construction of a two-step estimator to identify the primary
channels through which secessionist processes have influenced per capita GDP trajectories
in NICs, combining both parametric and semi-parametric techniques. In line with much
of the existing literature, we find robust evidence the the adverse effects of independence
increase in the extent of surface area loss, pointing to the presence of economies of scale,
but that NICs can mitigate at least some of the adverse effects of declaring independence
by opening up to trade and improving democratic institutions. Mirroring the lack of
consensus in the existing literature, we fail to find clear-cut results with respect to the
effect of state size while the effect of military conflict an macroeconomic uncertainty also
remain elusive, leaving ample room for future research.
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A Data construction and sources
In order to ensure a dataset that is as complete as possible, we draw on a wide variety
of data sources to construct several variables used in the empirical analysis. This section
describes in more detail the variable-specific data manipulation procedure utilized to con-
struct these variables. Table A1 summarizes the data sources and construction while also,
where relevant, reporting some diagnostics.
GDP per capita (baseline): To construct our baseline estimates of the country-specific
per capita GDP trajectories, we rely on a third-order polynomial approximation pro-
cedure that builds on Fearon and Laitin (2003a). We depart from the estimates for per
capita GDP measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars and reported by The Madison Project
(2013). This series starts in 1950 and ends in 2010 and provides 8794 (70.1%) of our 12544
country years. Subsequently, we maximally extend these estimates forward to 2013 and
backwards to 1960 using the growth rate of real per capita GDP provided by the World
Bank (2015), thereby adding another 1956 (15.6%) country-year observations. Afterward,
we remove 14 isolated country-year observations pertaining to the pre-independence sit-
uation in the group of former Soviet states. In a next step, we regress these baseline log
per capita GDP estimates on log per capita CO2 emissions, as reported by the World Re-
sources Institute (2015), a vector of year dummies, a region dummy for each of the seven
regions distinguished by the World Bank (2015), their squared and cubic values as well
as all possible third-order interactions. We then use the growth rate of the predicted per
capita GDP trajectories to maximally extend the baseline series forward and backwards,
adding another 1107 (8.8%) country-year observations.29 Data on the country-specific
emission levels of CO2 are available between 1950 and 2012 and, in itself, these correlate
fairly strongly with the baseline per capita income estimates, at 0.86 for their 9840 common
observations. That being said, with a correlation coefficient of 0.9, predicted per capita
GDP levels correlate even more strongly with the baseline estimates. Finally, evaluating
this least squares third-order polynomial model’s predictive accuracy on an observation-
by-prediction basis, we find that 58% of the baseline log per capita GDP observations fall
within the 99% confidence intervals of their predicted counterparts. Although this indi-
cates a fairly good match between the model’s data-generating process and our reference
series, this further motivates extending the reference data by relying on the growth rates
implied in these alternative predictions, rather than the predicted values themselves.
In order to further extend the existing data series, we repeat this exercise using infor-
mation on log per capita CO2 emissions contained in World Bank (2015). The World Bank
(2015) data on CO2 emissions runs from 1960-2013 and also shows a strong correlation
with baseline log per capita GDP (0.86 for their 8227 common observations). Neverthe-
29There remain several countries lacking any income estimates in the baseline series, but for which data
on the level of CO2 emissions are available. For these countries, we use the predicted per capita GDP
trajectories instead.
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less, the third-order polynomial predicted per capita GDP trajectories once again correlate
even more strongly with their baseline counterparts, yielding a correlation coefficient of
0.9, while the predictive accuracy of this model attains 57%. Once again using the growth
rate of predicted real per capita GDP to further extend the existing series forward and
backwards adds another 56 (0.05%) observations. The remaining 644 (5.1%) country-year
observations remain missing.30
GDP per capita (alternative): In order to make sure that our findings are not driven
by the data construction process, we also construct alternative per capita GDP estimates.
To do so, we synthetize a wide variety of data sources containing information on country-
specific levels of real per capita GDP. More specifically, we consider the information in
Barro and Lee (1994); Heston, Summers, and Aten (1994); The Madison Project (2013);
Gibler and Miller (2014b); CLIO Infra (2015); Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); The
Conference Board (2015); World Bank (2015).
To derive our alternative per capita GDP trajectory, we apply the following so-called
regular data construction procedure: (i) linearly interpolate missing observations in all
available data sources, (ii) selecting the most complete source (i.e. the source with the
most country-year observations) as the baseline series. Subsequently, (iii) from the al-
ternative data sources, select the dataset for which the overlapping path is most strongly
correlated with that of the base series and (iv) use the variation in the alternative source
to approximate as much missing values in the base series as possible. First, if the non-
overlapping observations in the alternative source pertain to a country already appearing
in the base series, use the growth rates in the alternative source to maximally extend the
base series forward and backwards. Second, if the non-overlapping observations in the
alternative data source pertain to a country not covered in the base series, express its per
capita GDP relative to that of the United States to approximate missing observations in
the base series. Finally, (v) repeat steps (iii)-(v) for each remaining data source.
Table A1, then, summarizes the percentage contribution of each data source to the
total number of observations as well as the correlation with the base series. Interestingly,
the correlation between the common 11214 baseline and alternative per capita GDP es-
timates equals 0.988, giving further credence to our polynomial approximation approach
to construct our baseline estimates. Unsurprisingly, our empirical results are not sensitive
to which measure of economic performance we use. Therefore, to economize on space,
further results pertaining to the alternative per capita GDP estimates are not reported.
Population: Data on the evolution of country-specific population size between 1950 and
2013 are obtained from Barro and Lee (1994); Heston et al. (1994); The Madison Project
(2013); CLIO Infra (2015); Feenstra et al. (2015); United Nations Population Division
(2015); World Bank (2015). Aggregation across datasets is obtained by applying the
30In each data source, we only rely on non-zero observations and treat zero observations as missing.
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regular data construction procedure outlined earlier. Doing so, our consolidated indicator
of population size is constructed by: (i) linearly interpolating missing observations in all
data sources; (ii) selecting the most complete as the baseline series; (iii) selecting the
alternative dataset for which the overlapping path is most strongly correlated with that of
the base series; (iv) using the variation in the alternative source to approximate as much
missing values in the base series as possible; and (v) repeating steps (iii)-(v) for each
remaining data source. As the correlation between all these different sources is nearly
perfect (cf. Table A1), our population variable is not sensitive to the selection of the base
series or the specific sequence of extensions.
Educational attainment: In order to construct a consolidated index representing the
average years of education attained in each country-year, we first gather data on the
average years of education as reported by Barro and Lee (1994, 2012); CLIO Infra (2015);
United Nations Development Program (2015); secondary education enrollment rates from
Barro and Lee (1994); World Bank (2015); and enrollment in tertiary education from
the World Bank (2015). In a second step, since most of these data are only reported five-
yearly, we linearly interpolate missing observations in each dataset. This seems reasonable,
as far as educational attainment evolves gradually over time. Subsequently, as it is the
most extensive data series, the Barro and Lee (2012) data on average years of education
is selected as baseline series. Covering the period 1950-2010, it provides 8723 (69.5%)
country-year estimates for the average years of education. In a next step, we maximally
extend these estimates forward to 2013 and backwards to 1980 using the growth rates
implied in the average years of education data reported by United Nations Development
Program (2015), adding another 849 (6.8%) estimates. Subsequently, we rely on the least
squares third-order polynomial approximation strategy outlined earlier to further extend
this baseline series where possible. Afterward, we linearly interpolate interrupted time
series to add 103 (0.8%) more country-years. 1352 (10.8%) country-years remain missing.
As detailed in Table A1, the correlation with the baseline values is fairly strong for
both the overlapping raw alternative estimates as well as the third-order polynomial pre-
dictions, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.74 to 0.98. In addition, the predictive
accuracy of our various third-order polynomial models generally is fairly high, where the
number of baseline estimates falling within the 99% confidence intervals of their predicted
counterparts range from 56.6% to 71.4%.
Life expectancy: Data on life expectancy is obtained from Barro and Lee (1994);
CLIO Infra (2015); World Bank (2015), where linear interpolation is first employed to add
a small number of missing observations. Since the correlation between the overlapping
observations in these datasets is near perfect, as detailed in Table A1, our consolidated
variable of interest is constructed by averaging across all available data sources, leaving
965 (7.7%) country-year observations missing.
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Trade openness: Data on trade openness, defined as the value of imports and exports
relative to GDP, are obtained from Heston et al. (1994); Feenstra et al. (2015); World
Bank (2015). After linearly interpolating missing observations in each dataset, we select
the Feenstra et al. (2015) data as our baseline. This dataset covers the period 1950-2011
and provides us with 9143 (72.9%) country-year observations. Subsequently, we maxi-
mally extend the existing data forward and backwards using the growth rates implied
in the World Bank (2015) data for an additional 503 (4%) country-year observations.
Finally, relying on the least squares third-order polynomial approximation procedure out-
lined above, we fill another 119 (0.9%) country-year observations based on the Heston et
al. (1994) data. 2779 (22.2%) country-year observations remain missing.
Democracy: In order to construct a composite index of democracy, we incorporate
information on 8 measures of democracy: Melton, Meserve, and Pemstein (2010); Giuliano,
Mishra, and Spilimbergo (2013); Center for Systemic Peace (2014); Gibler and Miller
(2014b); Vanhanen (2014); CLIO Infra (2015); Freedom House (2015); Skaaning, Gerring,
and Bartusevicˇius (2015).31 After linearly interpolating missing observations in each data
set, as it is the most extensive data source, we consider Vanhanen (2014) as our baseline
series. Vanhanen’s (2014) continuous measure of democracy, which is based on a country’s
degree of political competition and political participation, provides us with 9240 (73.7%)
democracy estimates. Subsequently, sequentially relying on the alternative democracy
measures, we apply the third-order polynomial approximation approach described earlier
to maximally extend this baseline series forward and backwards. After this procedure,
2807 (22.4%) country-year observations remain missing.
The fairly high correlation between both raw alternative as well as third-order polyno-
mial predicted democracy values and baseline values reported in Table A1, where corre-
lation coefficients range from 0.78 to 0.98, serves to motivate this approach. In addition,
the high predictive accuracy of our various third-order polynomial models, ranging from
59.9% to 87.7%, provides further evidence that these alternative democracy indexes pro-
vide useful information to assess missing values in the baseline series.
31For a comparison of various democracy indices, see among others Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and
Melton et al. (2010)
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Table A1: Constructed variables: data sources and components
Variable Data source Description % Obs. [% Int.] r / rˆ Accuracy
GDP per capita∗∗∗ (baseline)
The Madison Project (2013) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 70.11 [.] 1 / . .
World Bank (2015) GDP per capita (constant 2005 $) 15.59 [.] 0.91 / . .
World Resources Institute (2015) Total CO2 emissions (Metric Tons) 8.82 [.] 0.86 / 0.90 58.00
World Bank (2015) Per capita CO2 emissions (Metric Tons) 0.45 [.] 0.86 / 0.90 57.15
n.a. missing 5.13 [.] . / . .
GDP per capita∗∗ (alternative)
The Madison Project (2013) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 72.05 [1.95] 1 / . .
CLIO Infra (2015) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 0.02 [0.00] 1 / . .
The Conference Board (2015) GDP per capita (1990 int. GK $) 6.42 [0.00] 0.99 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) GDP per capita (1985 int. prices) 1.28 [0.96] 0.98 / . .
Heston et al. (1994) Real GDP per capita 0.31 [0.01] 0.96 / . .
World Bank (2015) GDP per capita (constant 2005 $) 8.46 [0.00] 0.91 / . .
Feenstra et al. (2015) GDP per capita (chained PPPs, 2005$) 0.58 [0.00] 0.90 / . .
Gibler and Miller (2014b) Real GDP per capita (1985 $) 0.43 [0.00] 0.77 / . .
n.a. missing 10.47 [.] . /. .
Population∗∗
CLIO Infra (2015) Total population 90.94 [67.08] 1 / . .
Heston et al. (1994) Total population 0.47 [0.00] 1 / . .
Feenstra et al. (2015) Total population 2.12 [0.00] 1 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) Total population 0.08 [0.06] 1 / . .
World Bank (2015) Total population 4.21 [0.00] 1 / . .
The Madison Project (2013) Total population 0.40 [0.00] 1 / . .
United Nations Population Division (2015) Total population 0.16 [0.00] 1 / . .
n.a. missing 1.63 [.] . / . .
Education∗∗∗
Barro and Lee (2012) Average years of education 69.54 [54.72] 1 / . .
United Nations Development Program (2015) Average years of education 6.77 [0.61] 0.98 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) Average years of education 0.89 [0.74] 0.96 / 0.98 71.39
CLIO Infra (2015) Average years of education 4.75 [4.24] 0.95 / 0.97 65.19
World Bank (2015) Secondary enrollment rate 6.18 [2.54] 0.88 / 0.93 57.59
Barro and Lee (1994) Secondary enrollment rate 0.27 [0.19] 0.87 / 0.92 65.14
World Bank (2015) Tertiary enrollment rate 0.53 [0.26] 0.74 / 0.87 56.65
Linearly interpolated . 0.82 [0.82] . / . .
n.a. missing 10.78 [.] . / . .
Health∗
CLIO Infra (2015) Life expectancy 84.50 [0.65] 1 / . .
World Bank (2015) Life expectancy 77.57 [0.03] 0.99 / . .
Barro and Lee (1994) Life expectancy 23.48 [18.06] 0.97 / . .
n.a. missing 7.35 [.] . / . .
Trade Openness∗∗∗
Feenstra et al. (2015) (imports + exports)/GDP 72.89 [0.00] 1 / . .
World Bank (2015) (imports + exports)/GDP 4.01 [0.00] 0.84 / . .
Heston et al. (1994) (imports + exports)/GDP 0.95 [0.00] 0.70 / 0.83 67.98
n.a. missing 22.15 [.] . / . .
Democracy∗∗∗
Vanhanen (2014) Vanhanen Index of Democracy 73.66 [0.15] 1 / . .
CLIO Infra (2015) Vanhanen Index of Democracy 1.27 [0.00] 0.97 / 0.98 87.73
Gibler and Miller (2014b) Combined Polity2 Index 0.81 [0.00] 0.90 / 0.94 68.38
Melton et al. (2010) Unified Democracy Scores 0.29 [0.16] 0.89 / 0.93 66.43
Giuliano et al. (2013) Freedom House Index 0.33 [0.18] 0.81 / 0.92 65.62
Freedom House (2015) Freedom House Index 1.07 [0.49] 0.82 / 0.91 59.91
Skaaning et al. (2015) Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy 0.10 [0.00] 0.79 / 0.90 66.08
Center for Systemic Peace (2014) Revised Combined Polity Score 0.02 [0.00] 0.78 / 0.89 97.66
n.a. missing 22.38 [.] . / . .
Note: Baseline sources in bold. * indicates that the consolidated variable is obtained by averaging across all available data sources, ** indicates that the consolidated variable is obtained by
applying the regular data construction procedure outlined in appendix A, *** indicates that the consolidated variable is obtained by applying the third-order polynomial approximation procedure
outlined in appendix A. The percentage of linearly interpolated country-years contributions by each data source in square brackets. r reports the correlation between baseline and alternative
values, rˆ reports the correlation between baseline and third-order polynomial predicted values. Where relevant, the last column reports the percentage of baseline observations falling withing the
99% confidence intervals of their third-order polynomial predicted counterparts.
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B Parametric estimation of the independence dividend
In this appendix, we follow a parametric approach to identify the independence dividend.
After outlining the general economic model, a next subsection explains the model selection
procedure. Subsequently, we present our baseline results and perform some additional
robustness checks. Finally, a last subsection provides instrumental variable estimates of
the independence dividend.
B.1 Estimation strategy
Based on the literature review, see section 1, we are interested in estimating the following
underlying economic model:
yi,t = β0 + β1NICi,t +
P∑
p=1
β1+pEt[NICi,t+p] +
Q∑
q=1
αqyi,t−q + θXi,t + λZi,t + δi + ηt + i,t (16)
where yi,t is the log of per capita GDP of country i at time t, NICi,t is an independence
dummy equal to 1 for each NIC in the first 30 years after it gained independence and
0 otherwise, Xi,t is a (1 × X) vector of observed controls, Zit is a (1 × Z) vector of
time-varying unobserved growth determinants, δi captures the I country fixed effects, ηt
denotes T year fixed effects and the error term, i,t, collects all random transitory shocks
to per capita GDP. The model also includes up to Q lags of the dependent variable to
allow for persistency in GDP dynamics. Et denotes the expectation taken with respect
to the information set at time t, reflecting the potential presence of anticipation effects
up to P years prior to a declaration of independence.32 The coefficient of interest is β1,
as this is the coefficient that will capture the economic impact of secession: a statistically
significant and positive estimate would indicate the presence of independence gains while
a statistically significant negative estimate would signify an independence cost.
As is standard, we deal with the potential problem of time-constant omitted variable
bias by removing time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, which may include hard-to-
quantify variables such as cultural norms or political institutions, using the standard
within estimator. To eliminate common per capita GDP trends that may be correlated
with declaring independence, year dummies are included in each specification as well.
To deal with the potential presence of finite anticipation effects, we estimate a quasi-
myopic model replacing the expectation of independence p years prior to the actual inde-
pendence declaration, Et[NICi,t+p], with leads of the independence-dummy, NIC
p
i,t. More
specifically, NICpi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country i will declare independence
at time t+ p, such that the ex ante effect of secession at time t+ p is estimated by β1+p.
32As discussed in the introduction, the pre-secession dip in per capita GDP may reflect anticipation effects.
If so, Malani and Reif (2015) show that their omission generates omitted variables bias.
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Denoting the within transformation of yit by y˜i,t = yi,t − 1Ti
∑Ti
t=1 yi,t, our baseline
linear regression specification related to equation (16) can be summarized as follows:
y˜i,t = β1 ˜NICi,t +
P∑
p=1
β1+p ˜NIC
p
i,t +
Q∑
q=1
αqy˜i,t−q + θX˜i,t + ηt + ˜Zi,t (17)
where the error term, ˜Zi,t = λZ˜i,t + ˜i,t, also subsumes variation over time in the z unob-
served growth determinants and the contents of X are detailed below.
In order for this relation between per capita GDP and the independence dummy to be
dynamically stable, the sum of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables (
∑Q
q=1 αq)
measuring the persistence in per capita GDP should be smaller than one. If this would
not be the case, a one-time decision to secede would cause explosive changes in per capita
GDP trajectories. To check whether explosive behavior can be ruled out, an appropri-
ate F-test can be employed (Acemoglu, Suresh, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2014). This is a
relevant issue, as the β1-coefficient in the regression model summarized in equation (17)
only estimates the immediate economic impact of secession or, equivalently, the effect of
declaring independence if independence is expected to last for one single period. Comput-
ing the effect of a permanent secession, β, involves accounting for the serially correlated
nature of per capita GDP which, under dynamic stability, boils down to:
βˆ =
βˆ1
1−∑Qq=1 αˆq (18)
Finally, a well-known problem with the model specified in equation (17) lies in the so-
called Nickell (1981) bias, which is inherent to the estimation of auto-regressive fixed effects
models and arises due to the mechanical correlation of the lagged dependent variables and
the error term. The fact that this bias declines in the length of the time series (T ), however,
suggests that dynamic panel bias should be negligible given the long time-dimension of
our dataset.33 Nevertheless, to account for dynamic panel bias, we also consider two
alternative estimators which are unbiased for finite T . First, we use a one-step generalized
methods of moment (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel models that was introduced by
Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995). Exploiting
the absence of residual auto-correlation, country fixed effects are first removed by applying
the forward orthogonal deviations transformation to all regressors while dynamic panel bias
is mitigated by subsequently instrumenting the transformed lagged dependent variables
using suitable lagged levels of yit.
34 In order to avoid an over-fitting bias (Roodman,
2006) the number of lagged instruments is restricted to a maximum of 5. In addition,
we consider the iterative bootstrap-based bias correction procedure for the fixed effects
estimator in dynamic panels proposed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007).35
33In the model lacking additional controls, each country is observed 57 times on average.
34The GMM estimator is implemented by Roodman’s (2006) xtabond2-command in Stata13.1.
35The bias correction is implemented by De Vos and Ruyssen’s (2015) xtbcfe-command in Stata13.1.
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B.2 Model selection
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables and anticipation dummies in equation (17)
serves to mitigate endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns, but requires us to de-
termine of the ‘optimal’ number of lagged dependent variables, Q∗, as well as the ‘optimal’
number of anticipation dummies, P ∗. To do so, we build on Stock and Watson (2012)
who suggest two approaches to choosing the optimal order of an auto-regressive model:
through a statistical significance criterion or using an information criterion. This first
approach starts with a model including many lags and subsequently sequentially checks
whether the coefficient on the last lag (or trailing lag) significantly differs from 0. If not,
the last lag is dropped and the procedure is repeated until the ‘optimal’ number of lags
is determined. By a similar procedure, in the second approach, the number of lags to be
included is selected according to the model minimizing the AIC criterion. As this second
approach penalizes model complexity, in contrast to the first approach, it is expected to
yield a more parsimonious model, reducing estimation uncertainty but potentially omitting
valuable information contained in more distant lags.
Since we need to determine both Q∗ and P ∗, we consider the statistical significance
and the information criterion approach in two different sequential scenarios. In the first
sequential scenario, Q∗ → P ∗, we start from the bivariate fixed-effects model to determine
the optimal number of lagged dependent variables (Q∗) first and only after this decide on
the number of anticipation terms (P ∗) to be included. In the second sequential scenario,
P ∗ → Q∗, the order is reversed and we first decide on P ∗ and subsequently determine Q∗.
To choose the optimal number of terms in either sequential scenario, we will consider
two trails: in the first, which we will refer to as the long trail, we start with a ‘long’ model
including 10 sequential terms and subsequently sequentially shorten the model at the last
term - the trailing lag or the trailing anticipation term - whenever our model selection
criterion dictates so. In the second, so-called short, trail we start with our fixed effects
bivariate model and subsequently rely on either model selection criterion to determine
whether a more extensive model specification is to be preferred.
Finally, to select the optimal specification resulting from this exercise, based on the
principle of parsimony, we adopt the most concise candidate model (i.e. the model which
minimizes P ∗ + Q∗) lacking first-order auto-correlation in the residuals.36 Although de-
ciding on the number of lags and anticipation terms to include is always and by necessity
somewhat arbitrary, this approach at least has the added benefit of providing some em-
pirical evidence suggesting a well specified estimation model.
The results of this exercise are reported in table A2. As it turns out, including 4
lags of the dependent variable sufficiently accounts for past GDP dynamics while relevant
anticipation effects are limited to the first 2 pre-secession years.
36The intuition behind this approach is that residual auto-correlation in a dynamic model “often indicates
that the functional form has not been completely specified” (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 412).
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Table A2: Quasi-myopic, autoregressive models of per capita GDP
Model selection criterion Sequence Trail Result AR(1)
Statistical significance (t-test) Q∗ → P ∗ short Q∗ = 4;P ∗ = 2 .21
Statistical significance (t-test) Q∗ → P ∗ long Q∗ = 8;P ∗ = 2 .01
Statistical significance (t-test) P ∗ → Q∗ short Q∗ = 4;P ∗ = 10 .21
Statistical significance (t-test) P ∗ → Q∗ long Q∗ = 4;P ∗ = 10 .21
Information criterion (AIC) Q∗ → P ∗ short Q∗ = 1;P ∗ = 2 .00
Information criterion (AIC) Q∗ → P ∗ long Q∗ = 1;P ∗ = 9 .00
Information criterion (AIC) P ∗ → Q∗ short Q∗ = 1;P ∗ = 10 .00
Information criterion (AIC) P ∗ → Q∗ long Q∗ = 1;P ∗ = 10 .00
Note: All estimations include the independence dummy as well as both country and year dummies.
The first three columns specify the model selection procedure. Column 4 indicates the resulting
candidate model. AR(1) reports the p-value of the Wooldridge (2009) test for the absence of
first-order auto-correlation in the residuals of the candidate model. Standard errors are robust for
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country-level.
B.3 Baseline results
The most straightforward situation to derive a reliable parametric estimate of the economic
impact of secession would occur when, conditional on past GDP dynamics, anticipation
effects as well as country and year fixed effects, the decision to secede and its expectation
are entirely unrelated to any other past or present growth determinant while, at the same
time, dynamic panel bias can be safely ignored due to the time-span of our dataset. To
formalize these ideas, assume that the following conditions are satisfied
Condition A1
E
[
˜NICi,t˜
ZX
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
E
[
˜NIC
1
i,t˜
ZX
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
E
[
˜NIC
2
i,t˜
ZX
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
Condition A2
E
[
y˜i,t−q ˜ZXi,s
]
= 0 ∀ t, s & ∀ q ∈ {1, . . . , Q∗}
where it is understood that ˜i,t
ZX = θX˜i,t + λZ˜i,t + ˜i,t.
Although, at first sight, these might seem rather strong assumptions, Wooldridge
(2009) emphasizes that including lagged dependent variables provides a useful, though
crude, strategy to control for more general omitted variable bias.
In this case, the standard within regression of the model outlined in equation (17)
lacking any additional controls, in effect leaving the X-matrix empty, would provide us
with a reliable estimate of the β1-coefficient. Column (1) in the top panel of table A3
reports the primary results of such an exercise while the full results are relegated to table
A7. Similar to all the other results we present in this section, per capita GDP trajectories
turn out to be highly persistent (in this case,
∑4
q=1 αq = 0.974). Nevertheless, an F-test
clearly rejects the null hypothesis of dynamic instability. More importantly, the estimated
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β1-coefficient is significantly negative and implies that per capita GDP is reduced by
approximately 0.4% in the year of independence. The serially correlated nature in per
capita GDP trajectories, however, implies that this adverse effect will accumulate in the
ensuing years and converge to a long-run payoff of -0.16. In other words, on average, a
declaration of independence significantly reduces per capita GDP levels by an estimated
16% in the long run. In addition, the results also indicate the presence of significantly
negative ex ante effects associated with a future state break-up, lowering per capita GDP
by an estimated 1.6% and 2.4% in the last two years prior to independence. Anticipation
effects thus appear to partially explain the pre-secession growth dip typically observed in
future NICs.
Nevertheless, the literature review contains several indications that condition A1 may
not hold in practice. One complication might arise since NICs, upon gaining independence,
tend to liberalize their trade regime to compensate for reduced market size. Secessions
also appear to be associated with increased pressures to democratize, accelerating the
transition towards more democratic political institutions. Our analysis has also abstracted
from political and economic relations among countries. This might be problematic, as
Alesina et al. (2000) argue that economic integration induces political disintegration. To
control for the economic significance of evolutions in these, and other, alternative growth
determinants we also consider a specification including several control variables. More
specifically, we consider a compact control vector, Xcompact, capturing contemporary
evolutions in democracy, trade openness, military conflict, human capital, surface area,
population differentials and political as well as macroeconomic instability. In addition,
we include dummy variables reflecting (historical) membership of the EU, the OECD, the
NATO, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the AU and the group of oil exporting countries.
By taking these covariates out of the error term, it now becomes more likely that
condition A1 holds with respect to the decision to secede and its prior anticipation. This,
however, comes at the cost of having to impose similar exogeneity assumptions on each
additional control (Wooldridge, 2009). We can express this idea formally by rewriting
condition A1 such that we now require:
Condition A1a
E
[
˜NICi,t˜
Z
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
E
[
˜NIC
1
i,t˜
Z
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
E
[
˜NIC
2
i,t˜
Z
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
E
[
x˜i,t˜
Z
i,s
]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s & ∀ x ∈ Xcompact
where the error term, ˜Zi,t = λZ˜i,t + ˜i,t, now contains less information.
The results of this compact control specification are reported in column (2) of the top
panel of table A3. Table A7 demonstrates that control variables tend to have the expected
46
sign and that most of them are statistically significant. With regard to the coefficients of
interest, although a lot of observations are lost due to the inclusion of these alternative
growth determinants, the overall pattern is fairly similar. The results do suggest a slightly
larger short-run cost of secession, which is now estimated to cut per capita GDP by 0.5%
in the first post-independence year, and a more adverse anticipation effect, which is limited
to the first pre-independence year and which reduces GDP per capita by 3.9% in the run-
up to state break-up. A slightly smaller persistence in per capita GDP implies that the
long-run, per capita cost of secession now roughly amounts to 12.4%, somewhat smaller
but still broadly similar to our previous estimate.
Finally, to check whether the implosion of multi-ethnic states is more costly in economic
terms we also include interactions of the independence dummy with a dummy indicating
ex-Soviet states as well as a dummy identifying former members of Yugoslavia. Finally,
Qvortrup (2014) suggests that declaring independence by referendum is particularly con-
ducive to peaceful political settlements such that successful independence referendums
potentially mitigate at least some of the economic costs of secession. To take these pro-
cedural aspects into account as well, we add the interaction between the independence
dummy and a dummy indicating the occurrence of a successful independence referendum
prior to the official declaration of independence.
The primary results stemming from the inclusion of this more extensive vector of con-
trol variables are reported in the last upper column of table A3. As can be seen, controlling
for these additional growth determinants does not qualitatively affect the results although,
compared to the baseline results, the long-run negative payoff of state fragmentation is
now estimated to be somewhat larger, reducing per capita GDP by roughly 16% in the
long run. We find some evidence that the implosion of multi-ethnic states is more ad-
verse in economic terms, as the estimated economic cost associated with of the break-up
of the Soviet union severely exceeds its sample-average counterpart, although former Yu-
goslavian countries do not appear to have suffered disproportionally from the implosion of
Yugoslavia. Finally, declaring independence by referendum does seem to mitigate these re-
ported secession costs as the coefficient associated with the interaction of the referendum-
and the independence-dummy is statistically significant and positive.
Recall that the standard within estimator ignores dynamic panel bias by imposing
condition A2. As mentioned, this might be reasonable given the long time-span of our
data set. To verify whether this effectively is the case, we repeat the previous exercise
using the orthogonal deviations GMM estimator instead, which is employed here to purge
dynamic panel bias. The corresponding estimates are reported in columns (1) to (3) in the
middle panel of table A3. Reassuringly, overall, the GMM estimates for all the coefficients
involved correspond well with the associated within estimates, confirming the intuition that
our prior results were not driven by dynamic panel bias. Correspondingly, the estimated
payoffs of state fragmentation in both the pre- and the post-independence period turn out
to be fairly similar and suggest a significant long-term effect of a 9.8% to 15.3% decrease
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in per capita GDP due the decision to secede. Interestingly, we find confirmation that ex-
Soviet members suffered disproportionally from the breaking up of their mother country
and that independence-by-referendum seems preferable from an economic point of view.
Importantly, we test the absence of second order auto-correlation in the differenced error
terms, which underpins the GMM estimator, and fail to find evidence that this exclusion
restriction is not met.
Alternatively, Everaert and Pozzi (2007) develop a simulation-based approach to es-
timate and remove dynamic panel bias through an iterative bootstrap-procedure. By
analogy, the results of applying this estimator instead are reported in columns (1) to (3)
in the bottom panel. Once again, bias-corrected estimates closely track their correspond-
ing within estimates. That being said, a slightly larger estimated persistence in per capita
GDP trajectories leads to a somewhat more pronounced estimated long-run secession cost,
which now hovers around 19% to 32% in per capita terms. Finally, the bootstrap-based
bias correction model does indicate that declarations of independence that are preceded
by a succesful independence referendum tend to do better while no confirmation is found
that former Soviet or Yugoslav states faced above-average costs of state break-up.
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Table A3: Parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession
Within estimates
Independence dummy -0.004** -0.005** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.024*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) -0.016*** -0.007 -0.006
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.024**
(0.011)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.009
(0.019)
Independence dummy × referendum dummy 0.014***
(0.003)
Observations [# countries] 11,128 [192] 8,318 [187] 8,318 [187]
Adjusted R-squared 0.980 0.978 0.978
Country + Year FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .974 [0] .956 [0] .956 [0]
Long-run effect [p-value] -.161 [.037] -.124 [.038] -.16 [.013]
Deviations GMM estimates
Independence dummy -0.006** -0.006** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.020** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) -0.011** -0.006 -0.005
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.022*
(0.011)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.009
(0.018)
Independence dummy × referendum dummy 0.014***
(0.004)
Observations [# countries] 10,935 [192] 8,131 [187] 8,131 [187]
Country + Year FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .934 [0] .951 [0] .952 [0]
p-value AR2 .213 .265 .298
Long-run effect [p-value] -.098 [.044] -.118 [.038] -.153 [.017]
Bootstrap-based bias-corrected estimates
Independence dummy -0.004* -0.006** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.025** -0.040*** -0.039***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) -0.017*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.020
(0.016)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.008
(0.032)
Independence dummy × Referendum dummy 0.015***
(0.004)
Observations 11,111 [192] 8,318 [187] 8,318 [187]
Country + Year FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .988 [.001] .971 [0] .972 [0]
Long-run effect [p-value] -.32 [.117] -.192 [.019] -.256 [.004]
Note: The table presents parametric estimates of the effect of declaring independence on log per
capita GDP. The top panel uses the within estimator; the middle panel uses the orthogonal deviations
GMM estimator, which treats all lagged dependent variables as endogenous and all other variables
as predetermined. The bottom panel uses the bootstrap-based bias-correction estimator implemented
with i.i.d resampling, analytical heterogeneous initiation and bootstrapped standard errors based on
50 iterations. F-test reports the p-value of the persistence in GDP being smaller than 1; AR(2) reports
the p-value of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second-order auto-correlation in first differences.
The estimated long-run economic impact of secession, as well as the p-value for this being different
from 0, is reported in the bottom row. Standard errors of the long-run effect are computed through
the delta-method, see Papke and Wooldridge (2005). The full results are reported in table A7.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.4 Robustness check: instrumental variable estimates
One major drawback of the previous estimators lies in the fact that they critically hinge on
the strict exogeneity assumption imposed on the independence dummy and its anticipation
effects, see conditions A1 and A1a. Although we relaxed this assumption by including
several alternative growth predictors as controls, it is still possible for the decision to
secede to be related to any number of past or present unobserved growth determinants, z.
For example, increasing inter-regional income differentials in the mother country may both
depress future growth and stimulate demands for autonomy.37 To more extensively deal
with the concern of unobserved local economic conditions co-determining both incentives
to secede as well as growth potential, we conclude this parametric route by developing an
instrumental variable (IV) approach.
To do so, recall that secessions historically have tended to occur in waves (Spencer,
1998; Fazal & Griffiths, 2008; Dahl et al., 2013; Qvortrup, 2014). This observation is
visualized in figure A1, which plots world wide state entry for each year between 1950 and
2013: the 1960-peak coincides with the African decolonization process; the elevated level
of state entry between 1970 and 1980 reflects several South American countries gaining
independence; the peak around 1990 captures the dissolution of both the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. Following similar arguments as those related to the spatio-temporal clustering
of global democratization waves (Acemoglu et al., 2014), we argue that, while it is still
unclear why state fragmentation has a tendency to occur in waves, these waves appear
unrelated to contemporary economic trends. Rather, they seem to reflect political demands
for self-determination and democracy. To the extent that this is the case, global waves of
secession provide an attractive source of exogenous variation in local incentives to secede.
Figure A1: Global waves of secession
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Note: The figure plots net state entry in the world in the period 1950-2013.
37See Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) for evidence on income inequality being
a drag on economic growth. For a theoretical explanation as to why inter-regional income inequalities
may trigger secessionist tendencies, see Bolton and Roland (1997).
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Therefore, to instrument the independence dummy and its anticipation effects, we
construct an index of global, non-regional secession waves for each of the seven regions
distinguished by the World Bank (2015). More specifically, this index collects the natural
log of the total number of countries in the rest of the world, excluding countries in the
own region. Formally, denoting the relevant regions by r ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, we define our index
of non-regional secession waves, Ii,t, for country i in region r at time t as
Ii,t = ln
(∑
j /∈r
1j,t
)
(19)
where 1j,t is an indicator function equal to 1 if country j is independent at time t.
Figure A2 plots the values of this index for the period 1950-2013. Irrespective of
geographical location, there are clear temporary upward trends in the values of the index
reflecting that global waves of secession were tightly clustered in time during this period.
For example, the total number of countries in the rest of the world drastically increased
for each region around 1960, except for Sub-Sahara Africa where a lot of these NICs were
located. Similarly, the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia caused an increase in
the value of the index for each region except Europe & Central Asia.
Figure A2: Non-regional waves of secession
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Note: The figure plots non-regional state entry for the seven regions distinguished by the World Bank (2015).
We contend that this index provides us with both strong and valid instruments for
the independence dummy and its anticipation terms in the first-stage regressions. First,
given the time-clustered nature of state entry at the global level, this index should capture
global political opportunities of independence and reflect, among other factors, the global
political willingness to accept the right to self-determination. This, in turn, is expected
to co-determine local aspirations of independence, implying that the index contains useful
information to gauge local incentives to secede. Our first-stage results, reported below,
provide further empirical evidence in this regard. On the other hand, we maintain that
there is no a priori theoretical reason why the (evolution in the) total number of coun-
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tries in the rest of the world should influence local per capita GDP trajectories, except
through their influence on local incentives to secede. To maximally ensure that the latter
condition holds, we exclude regional trends in the computation of the index since these
could proxy for the presence of local trade disruptions, military conflict and/or macroe-
conomic instability. In addition, we show below that explicitly including these covariates
as controls does not qualitatively affect the results. Finally we only rely on contemporary
and future values of the index because it seems unlikely that unknown future evolutions in
non-regional state formation would alter current economic behavior, as opposed to known
past trends. In order to enable a Hansen-type test for the overall validity of the instru-
mentsinstruments, we include the contemporary values of this index along with its nearest
three leads.. This yields the following fixed effects two-stage least squares model:
y˜i,t = β1 ˜NICi,t + β2 ˜NIC
1
i,t + β3
˜NIC
2
i,t +
4∑
q=1
αqy˜i,t−q + θX˜i,t + ηt + ˜Zi,t
˜NICi,t =
3∑
s=0
σsI˜i,t+s +
4∑
q=1
φqy˜i,t−q + ξt + υ˜i,t
˜NIC
1
i,t =
3∑
s=0
ϕsI˜i,t+s +
4∑
q=1
ρqy˜i,t−q + ζt + u˜i,t
˜NIC
2
i,t =
3∑
s=0
νsI˜i,t+s +
4∑
q=1
$qy˜i,t−q + χt + γ˜i,t
(20)
where the relevant exclusion restrictions now boil down to
Condition 3
E
[
˜NICi,t
(
I˜i,t, I˜i,t+1, I˜i,t+2, I˜i,t+3
)′] 6= 0
E
[
˜NIC
1
i,t
(
I˜i,t, I˜i,t+1, I˜i,t+2, I˜i,t+3
)′] 6= 0
E
[
˜NIC
2
i,t
(
I˜i,t, I˜i,t+1, I˜i,t+2, I˜i,t+3
)′] 6= 0
E
[
˜Zi,s
(
I˜i,t, I˜i,t+1, I˜i,t+2, I˜i,t+3
)′]
= 0 ∀ t ≥ s
The baseline results of our IV-approach are reported in column (1) of table A4. In
line with subsequent estimations, the strong first-stage results (F-statistic = 227) confirm
the expected correlation between contemporary incentives to secede in the own country
and contemporary as well as future realizations of independence in the rest of the world.
Reassuringly, a Hansen J-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that our over-identification
restrictions hold (p-value = 0.78), finding no evidence of global waves of secessions co-
determining local per capita GDP trajectories outside of their impact on local incentives
to secede. Similar to our previous results, there is a fairly high amount of persistence in
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per capita GDP (in this case,
∑4
q=1 αq = 0.973) but an F-test rejects dynamic instability.
With regard to the coefficients of interest, first note that our results now suggest the
absence of any relevant anticipation effects, as the coefficient associated with the lead of
the independence dummy is now statistically insignificant. The absence of meaningful pre-
independence trends in per capita GDP trajectories of NICs nearing their declaration of
independence is reassuring, in the sense that this points towards the instrument exogeneity
requirement being met: prior to their actual declaration of independence, global waves
of secession seem not systematically negatively related to economic conditions in future
NICs. Only to the extent that they coincide with the period following a NIC’s actual
declaration of independence do they statistically significantly and negatively affect per
capita GDP trajectories in NICs. Remarkably, the estimated adverse long-run impact
of state fragmentation is now roughly twice as high in comparison to the simple pooled
OLS estimates reported earlier. More specifically, our benchmark IV-estimates imply a
short-run per capita secession cost of around 1.4% and an implied long-run cost of 54%,
which are in the range of our semi-parametric estimates.
Column (2), then, controls for the possibility that global, non-regional waves of se-
cession do violate the exclusion restriction of instrument validity by proxying for local
military conflict, macroeconomic instability and/or trade disruptions. Reassuringly, as
can be seen, our baseline results are fairly stable with respect to the inclusion of these
control variables and the estimated long-run per capita cost of independence now in-
creases to 75%. The third column, finally, confirms once again our prior finding that
independence-by-referendum seems preferable from an economic point of view.
One possible explanation for these rather gloomy estimates of the economic impact
of secession is that they stem from the bluntness of the instruments at our disposal,
which approximate country-level incentives to secede with regional-level information on
non-regional secession waves. Doing so, our first-stage results might lead to an over-
accentuation of the economic trends of highly secessionist countries located in historically
secession-rich regions, such as Sub Sahara Africa. Compared to highly secessionist coun-
tries located in secession-poorer regions, these countries may face more severe indepen-
dence costs precisely because of the accumulation of adverse effects of state fragmentation
in their associated region.38 Keeping this in mind, exploiting variation in contemporary
and future global, non-regional waves of secessions qualitatively confirms our prior conclu-
sions suggesting that past instances of state fragmentation persistently adversely impacted
per capita GDP trajectories in NICs, and potentially severely so.
38Venables (2010), for instance, claims that excessive state fragmentation in Sub Sahara Africa hampers
growth by, among other factors, diminishing agglomeration economies.
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Table A4: Economic impact of secession (IV estimates)
IV regression results
(1) (2) (3)
Independence dummy -0.014*** -0.035** -0.041**
(0.004) (0.015) (0.018)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.033 -0.057 -0.075
(0.023) (0.125) (0.149)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) 0.009 -0.018 -0.038
(0.017) (0.077) (0.092)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.019
(0.102)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.003
(0.087)
Independence dummy × referendum dummy 0.038***
(0.014)
Observations 10,768 [192] 8,184 [187] 8,184 [187]
Adjusted R-squared 0.979 0.976 0.958
Country + Year FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .973 [] .954 [] .954 []
Hansen-J test [ p-value] .078 [.78] 1.444 [.23] 1.063 [.303]
F-test [first stage] 227.58 23.13 13.92
Long-run effect [p-value] -.537 [0] -.753 [.023] -.895 [.026]
Note: This table presents fixed effects two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of gaining indepen-
dence on per capita GDP, where both the decision to secede and its anticipation are instrumented by the
four nearest (future) non-regional secession waves. Standard errors, robust against heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation at the country level, in parantheses. F-test reports the p-value of the persis-
tence in GDP being smaller than 1; F-test [first stage] reports first stage F-statistic of the excluded
instruments; Hansen-J reports the p-value of a Hansen over-identification test. The estimated long-run
economic impact of secession, as well as the p-value for this being different from 0, are reported in the
bottom row. Standard errors of the long-run effect are computed through the delta-method, see Papke
and Wooldridge (2005).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Newly Independent Countries: 1950-2015
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Libya 1951 Uganda 1962 Saint Lucia 1979
Cambodia* 1953 Kenya 1963 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 1979
Lao PDR 1953 Malawi 1964 Antigua & Barbuda 1981
Vietnam 1954 Malta* 1964 Belize 1981
Morocco 1956 Zambia 1964 Vanuatu 1981
Sudan 1956 Gambia 1965 Saint Kitts & Nevis 1983
Tunisia 1956 Maldives 1965 Brunei Darussalam 1984
Ghana 1957 Singapore* 1965 Marshall Islands 1986
Malaysia 1957 Zimbabwe 1965 Micronesia* 1986
Guinea* 1958 Barbados 1966 Namibia 1990
Benin 1960 Botswana 1966 Yemen 1990
Burkina Faso 1960 Guyana 1966 Armenia* 1991
Cameroon 1960 Lesotho 1966 Azerbaijan 1991
Central African Republic 1960 South Yemen 1967 Belarus 1991
Chad 1960 Equatorial Guinea 1968 Estonia* 1991
Congo 1960 Mauritius 1968 Georgia* 1991
Congo Republic 1960 Swaziland 1968 Kazakhstan 1991
Cote d’Ivoire 1960 Fiji 1970 Kyrgyz Republic 1991
Cyprus 1960 Bahrain 1971 Latvia* 1991
Gabon 1960 Bangladesh 1971 Lithuania* 1991
Madagascar 1960 Oman 1971 Moldova 1991
Mali 1960 Qatar 1971 Russian Federation 1991
Mauritania 1960 United Arab Emirates 1971 Tajikistan 1991
Niger 1960 Bahamas 1973 Turkmenistan* 1991
Nigeria 1960 Grenada 1974 Ukraine* 1991
Senegal 1960 Guinea-Bissau 1974 Uzbekistan* 1991
Somalia 1960 Angola 1975 Croatia* 1992
Togo 1960 Cabo Verde 1975 Slovenia 1992
Kuwait 1961 Comoros 1975 Czech Republic 1993
Sierra Leone 1961 Mozambique 1975 Eritrea* 1993
Syrian Arab Republic 1961 Papua New Guinea 1975 Macedonia* 1993
Tanzania 1961 Sao Tome & Principe 1975 Slovak Republic 1993
Algeria* 1962 Suriname 1975 Palau* 1994
Burundi 1962 Seychelles 1976 Timor-Leste* 2002
Jamaica* 1962 Djibouti 1977 Montenegro* 2006
North Yemen 1962 Dominica 1978 Serbia 2006
Rwanda 1962 Solomon Islands 1978 Kosovo 2008
Samoa* 1962 Tuvalu 1978 South Sudan* 2011
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 Kiribati 1979
Note: * indicates countries that gained independence following a successful independence referendum. Data on historical
independence referendums and their outcomes are taken from Qvortrup (2014).
 indicates countries included in the synthetic control algorithm (see section 3).
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Table A6: Semi-parametric estimates of the economic impact of secession
t = T0 + 1 t = T0 + 5 t = T0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
Algeria -.219 -.216*** -.205*** -.202*** -.304 -.301*** -.276*** -.272*** -.285 -.282*** -.226*** -.222***
Angola -.77 -.792*** -.76*** -.788*** -.963 -.985*** -.924*** -.953*** -.975 -.997*** -.827*** -.856***
Antigua & Barbuda .424 .409*** .475*** .418*** 1.04 1.024*** 1.109*** 1.053*** 1.127 1.111*** 1.318*** 1.262***
Armenia -0.682 -.613*** -.599*** -.586*** -.604 -.535*** -.499*** -.486*** .184 .253*** .405*** .419***
Azerbaijan -.528 -.547*** -.446*** -.52*** -1.288 -1.306*** -1.183*** -1.257*** -.002 -.021 .219*** .146**
Bahamas -.347 -.447*** -.331*** -.448*** -.385 -.485*** -.351*** -.469*** -.44 -.54*** -.308*** -.425***
Bahrain -.071 -.068*** -.043*** -.05*** -.069 -.066*** -.045** -.052** -.861 -.859*** -.736*** -.743***
Bangladesh -.316 -.309*** -.302*** -.298*** -.373 -.366*** -.366*** -.361*** -.424 -.417*** -.307*** -.303***
Barbados .068 .071*** .08*** .083*** .12 .123*** .141*** .144*** -.085 -.082*** -.028 -.024
Belarus -.33 -.317*** -.247*** -.289*** -0.683 -.67*** -.578*** -.62*** .14 .153*** .361*** .319***
Belize -.09 -.092*** -.039* -.081*** -.262 -.264*** -.191*** -.233*** .088 .087*** .262*** .22***
Benin -.008 -.006 .013 .012 -.063 -.062*** -.027 -.028 -.271 -.269*** -.231*** -.232***
Botswana -.132 .186*** -.12*** .197*** .14 .457*** .16*** .478*** .995 1.313*** 1.053*** 1.37***
Brunei Darussalam -.1 -.246*** -.024 -.21*** -.305 -.451*** -.196*** -.381*** -.615 -.761*** -.39*** -.575***
Burundi -.402 -.261*** -.388*** -.246*** -.468 -.327*** -.439*** -.297*** -.23 -.088** -.169*** -.027
Cabo Verde -.256 -.267*** -.241*** -.259*** .099 .087*** .144*** .126*** .336 .324*** .491*** .473***
Comoros -.336 -.334*** -.325*** -.33*** -.455 -.452*** -.416*** -.42*** -.187 -.184*** -.039 -.043
Congo .002 .004 .021 .017 -.066 -.065*** -.033 -.037* -.028 -.026*** .011 .007
Croatia -.429 -.549*** -.338*** -.514*** -.286 -.406*** -.166*** -.341***
Cyprus .025 .046 .044** .06* -.008 .013 .026 .042 .481 .502*** .52*** .535***
Czech Republic -.523 -.435*** -.452*** -.407*** -.518 -.43*** -.429*** -.385***
Djibouti -.206 -.211*** -.162*** -.185*** -.259 -.264*** -.195*** -.218*** -0.825 -.831*** -.639*** -.662***
Estonia -.313 -.419*** -.231*** -.391*** -.321 -.427*** -.217*** -.377*** .202 .097** .423*** .263***
Fiji -.178 -.007 -.164*** 0 -.163 .008 -.146*** .017 -.12 .051 -.005 .158***
Gambia .147 .153*** .162*** .17*** .068 .074*** .084*** .092*** -.171 -.166*** -.107*** -.1**
continued on next page
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continued
t = T0 + 1 t = T0 + 5 t = T0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
Georgia -1.121 -1.146*** -1.029*** -1.116*** -1.459 -1.484*** -1.34*** -1.427*** -.772 -.797*** -.54*** -.627***
Ghana -.096 -.097*** -.104*** -.108*** -.035 -.035** -.013 -.017 -.665 -.665*** -.622*** -.626***
Grenada -.209 -.211*** -.192*** -.211*** -.142 -.144*** -.092*** -.111*** -.024 -.026 .128*** .109**
Guinea-Bissau .16 .121*** .175*** .13*** .118 .08*** .166*** .122*** .023 -.016 .182*** .137***
Guyana -.041 -.021 -.03** -.01 -.069 -.049* -.045** -.026 -.746 -.726*** -.662*** -.643***
Jamaica -.043 -.043 -.03** -.031 -.065 -.064 -.039** -.04 -.639 -.638*** -.59*** -.59***
Kazakhstan -.457 -.457*** -.375*** -.43*** -.776 -.776*** -.671*** -.726*** -.186 -.186*** .036 -.019
Kenya -.081 -.06** -.073*** -.052** .005 .026 .019 .04 -.199 -.178*** -.154*** -.132***
Kiribati -.988 -.959*** -.939*** -.933*** -.986 -.957*** -.913*** -.907*** -1.174 -1.145*** -.988*** -.982***
Kyrgyz Republic -.164 -.146*** -.082*** -.119*** -0.699 -.681*** -.595*** -.632*** -.535 -.517*** -.314*** -.351***
Latvia -.548 -.716*** -.466*** -.689*** -.627 -.795*** -.523*** -.746*** -.155 -.323*** .066 -.157***
Lesotho -.133 .157*** -.121*** .169*** -.175 .115*** -.154*** .136*** -.118 .173*** -.06* .23***
Lithuania -.467 -.493*** -.384*** -.466*** -.755 -.781*** -.651*** -.732*** -.283 -.309*** -.062 -.143***
Macedonia -.353 -.409*** -.281*** -.381*** -.437 -.493*** -.348*** -.448***
Malawi -.44 -.121*** -.429*** -.11*** -.324 -.005 -.31*** .009 -.478 -.16*** -.456*** -.138***
Malaysia -.097 -.094*** -.105*** -.105*** -.081 -.078*** -.06*** -.06** .136 .14*** .179*** .179***
Malta .043 .034 .053*** .045* .063 .054** .078*** .07*** .406 .397*** .45*** .442***
Mauritius -.263 -.258*** -.25*** -.248*** -.218 -.212*** -.202*** -.2*** .024 .029 .094** .097**
Moldova -0.576 -.613*** -.494*** -.586*** -1.178 -1.216*** -1.074*** -1.166*** -1.022 -1.06*** -.802*** -.894***
Montenegro .276 .226*** .378*** .239*** .378 .329*** .487*** .349***
Morocco -.12 -.122*** -.126*** -.127*** -.205 -.207*** -.191*** -.193*** -.208 -.21*** -.15*** -.151***
Mozambique -.236 -.317*** -.225*** -.313*** -.337 -.418*** -.298*** -.385*** -.492 -.573*** -.344*** -.432***
Namibia -.247 -.176*** -.166*** -.153*** -.141 -.07* -.032 -.02 -.121 -.05 .117** .13**
Nigeria -.043 -.039*** -.024 -.025 -.052 -.048*** -.018 -.019 .006 .01 .045 .043
Palau -.084 -.019 .007 .01 -.182 -.117** -.072*** -.069
Papua New Guinea -.171 -.183*** -.16*** -.179*** -.354 -.366*** -.315*** -.335*** -.451 -.464*** -.304*** -.324***
continued on next page
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continued
t = T0 + 1 t = T0 + 5 t = T0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
Qatar .257 .029 .284*** .047 .645 .417*** .667*** .431*** -.168 -.396*** -.044 -.28***
Russian Federation -.31 -.334*** -.225*** -.306*** -.709 -.732*** -.595*** -.677*** -.283 -.307*** -.045 -.126**
Rwanda -.107 -.108*** -.092*** -.093*** -.203 -.204*** -.174*** -.174*** .152 .151*** .212*** .212***
Saint Kitts & Nevis .335 .283*** .395*** .303*** .659 .607*** .764*** .673*** .787 .735*** 1.016*** .924***
Saint Lucia -.097 -.133*** -.046** -.103*** -.057 -.094*** .022 -.034 .182 .146*** .386*** .33***
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines .032 .054* .082*** .084*** .148 .17*** .228*** .23*** .484 .506*** .688*** .689***
Sao Tome & Principe -.027 -.047* -.003 -.045 .271 .251*** .32*** .277*** -.11 -.13*** .033 -.01
Serbia .009 .065*** .112*** .079*** .047 .103*** .152*** .118***
Seychelles .095 .108*** .131*** .132*** .032 .045** .088*** .089*** .302 .315*** .478*** .479***
Singapore .036 .058*** .051*** .075*** .287 .31*** .303*** .327*** 0.812 .834*** .875*** .899***
Slovak Republic -.467 -.388*** -.397*** -.361*** -.366 -.287*** -.277*** -.241***
Slovenia -.317 -.31*** -.226*** -.275*** -.249 -.242*** -.127*** -.177*** -.148 -.141*** .053 .004
Solomon Islands -.004 .023 .047*** .058** .08 .106*** .141*** .152*** .148 .174*** .325*** .336***
Suriname -.118 -.151*** -.107*** -.147*** -.28 -.313*** -.241*** -.281*** -.716 -.749*** -.568*** -.608***
Swaziland .129 .126* .136*** .129** .386 .383*** .395*** .388*** .457 .454*** .531*** .524***
Syrian Arab Republic .076 .077* .081*** .083** -.208 -.207*** -.19*** -.188*** .257 .258*** .293*** .295***
Tajikistan -.791 -.624*** -.714*** -.598*** -1.658 -1.491*** -1.559*** -1.442*** -1.196 -1.028*** -.972*** -.856***
Tanzania -.244 -.233*** -.239*** -.228*** -.283 -.273*** -.265*** -.253*** -.326 -.315*** -.289*** -.278***
Timor-Leste -.429 -.116 -.326*** -.092 -.587 -.274* -.477*** -.244***
Trinidad & Tobago -.053 -.054** -.039*** -.042* -.111 -.112*** -.081*** -.085*** -.244 -.245*** -.2*** -.203***
Turkmenistan -.157 -.146*** -.075*** -.119*** -.543 -.531*** -.439*** -.482*** -.045 -.033 .176*** .133**
Uganda -.026 -.026*** -.011 -.014 -.033 -.033*** -.003 -.005 -.72 -.719*** -.675*** -.678***
Ukraine -.276 -.287*** -.191*** -.259*** -1.02 -1.031*** -.907*** -.975*** -.777 -.788*** -.539*** -.607***
United Arab Emirates -.147 -.211*** -.12*** -.193*** -.047 -.111*** -.025 -.097*** -.735 -.799*** -.611*** -.683***
Uzbekistan -.217 -.164*** -.134*** -.137*** -.459 -.407*** -.355*** -.358*** -.012 .04** .209*** .207***
Vanuatu -.132 -.171** -.08*** -.16*** .016 -.023 .088*** .008 -.725 -.764*** -.551*** -.631***
continued on next page
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continued
t = T0 + 1 t = T0 + 5 t = T0 + 20
Country βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
βˆjt βˆjt
tDD
βˆjt
pDD
βˆjt
DDD
Zambia .133 .13*** .146*** .143*** -.039 -.042** -.023 -.025 -.737 -.739*** -.679*** -.682***
Zimbabwe -.124 -.139*** -.114*** -.127*** .079 .064*** .097*** .083*** -.463 -.479*** -.397*** -.411***
Note: This table reports country-specific, semi-parametric estimates of the independence dividend. Results are reported for all available NICs and pertain to the 1st, 5th
and 20th year after independence respectively. Columns headed by βˆjt report the estimated percentage difference between per capita GDP for the NIC listed in the first
column and its synthetic control version, corresponding to equation 10 ; columns headed by βˆtDDjt report the trend-demeaned independence dividend estimate, net of its
10-yearly pre-independence average, as outlined in equation 11 ; columns headed by βˆpDDjt report the placebo-demeaned independence dividend estimate, net of its average
contemporary placebo gap, as outlined in equation 12 ; columns headed by βˆDDDjt report the trend- and placebo-demeaned independence dividend estimate, as defined in
equation 13. Standard errors are robust for heteroskedasticity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: Baseline parametric estimates (full results)
Within estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Independence dummy -0.004** -0.005** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.024**
(0.011)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.009
(0.019)
Independence dummy × referendum dummy 0.014***
(0.003)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.024*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) -0.016*** -0.007 -0.006
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
log Per capita GDP (t-1) 1.091*** 1.136*** 1.135***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
log Per capita GDP (t-2) -0.030 -0.095** -0.095**
(0.048) (0.039) (0.039)
log Per capita GDP (t-3) -0.010 -0.012 -0.013
(0.046) (0.025) (0.025)
log Per capita GDP (t-4) -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.071***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.018)
log Trade openness 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
log Surface area -0.070 -0.064
(0.062) (0.062)
log Educational attainment -0.007 -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
Life Expectancy 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
log Battle deaths -3.440 -3.475
(2.660) (2.681)
log Population density -0.029*** -0.030***
(0.009) (0.009)
Democracy 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic uncertainty -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Political instability -0.038*** -0.038***
(0.014) (0.014)
Oil exporting countries 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.004)
WTO-membership 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
EU-membership -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
AU-membership -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
ASEAN-membership 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.008)
OECD-membership -0.008 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
MERCOSUR-membership -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
NATO-membership -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations [# countries] 11,128 [192] 8,318 [187] 8,318 [187]
Adjusted R-squared 0.980 0.978 0.978
Country + Year FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .974 [0] .956 [0] .956 [0]
Long-run effect [p-value] -.161 [.037] -.124 [.038] -.16 [.013]
Note: See relevant notes table A3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Baseline parametric estimates (full results) continued
Deviations GMM estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Independence dummy -0.006** -0.006** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.009
(0.009)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.011
(0.021)
Independence dummy × referendum dummy 0.009
(0.006)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.020** -0.039*** -0.034**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) -0.011** -0.006 -0.002
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
log Per capita GDP (t-1) 1.095*** 1.163*** 1.259***
(0.045) (0.067) (0.069)
log Per capita GDP (t-2) -0.116** -0.151* -0.193**
(0.055) (0.084) (0.085)
log Per capita GDP (t-3) 0.005 -0.009 -0.012
(0.048) (0.026) (0.027)
log Per capita GDP (t-4) -0.050** -0.053*** -0.064***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
log Trade openness 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
log Surface area -0.080 -0.070
(0.066) (0.066)
log Educational attainment -0.007 -0.008*
(0.005) (0.005)
Life Expectancy 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
log Battle deaths -3.326 -3.359
(2.625) (2.648)
log Population density -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.012) (0.012)
Democracy 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic uncertainty -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Political instability -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.014) (0.014)
Oil exporting countries 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
WTO-membership 0.005* 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
EU-membership -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
AU-membership -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
ASEAN-membership 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.010)
OECD-membership -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
MERCOSUR-membership -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
NATO-membership -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 10,935 [192] 8,131 [187] 8,131 [187]
Country FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .934 [0] .951 [0] .952 [0]
p-value AR2 .213 .265 .298
Long-run effect [p-value] -.098 [.044] -.118 [.038] -.153 [.017]
Note: See relevant notes table A3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Baseline parametric estimates (full results) continued
Bootstrap-based bias corrected estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Independence dummy -0.004* -0.006** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Independence dummy × Soviet dummy -0.020
(0.016)
Independence dummy × Yugoslav dummy 0.008
(0.032)
Independence dummy × Referendum dummy 0.015***
(0.004)
Ex ante effect (t - 1) -0.025** -0.040*** -0.039***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Ex ante effect (t - 2) -0.017*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
log Per capita GDP (t-1) 1.106*** 1.149*** 1.149***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.035)
log Per capita GDP (t-2) -0.031 -0.096** -0.096**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041)
log Per capita GDP (t-3) -0.009 -0.012 -0.012
(0.049) (0.028) (0.028)
log Per capita GDP (t-4) -0.077*** -0.070*** -0.069***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.016)
log Trade Openness 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
log Surface area -0.040 -0.033
(0.064) (0.065)
log Educational attainment -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Life Expectancy 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
log Battle deaths -3.297 -3.339
(4.782) (4.764)
log Population density -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.007) (0.007)
Democracy 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic uncertainty -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Political instability -0.040** -0.040***
(0.017) (0.014)
Oil exporting states 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
WTO-membership 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
EU-membership -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
AU-membership -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
ASEAN-membership 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010)
OECD-membership -0.007 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
MERCOSUR-membership -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
NATO-membership -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 11,111 [192] 8,318 [187] 8,318 [187]
Country + Year FE yes yes yes
Control vector none Xcompact Xextensive∑4
q=1 αq [F-test <1] .988 [.001] .971 [0] .972 [0]
Long-run effect [p-value] -.32 [.117] -.192 [.019] -.256 [.004]
Note: See relevant notes table A3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A3: Average impact of secession in selected countries
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(a) All cases
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(b) 50% best matched cases
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(c) 25% best matched cases
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(d) 10% best matched cases
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(e) All cases within caliper
Note: This figure plots the yearly average percentage gap between NICs and their synthetic counterparts,
along with the 95% confidence interval. The number of years before (-) or after (+) independence are
indicated on the horizontal axis. The top-left panel contains all available cases, subsequent panels include
only results of the 50, 25 and 10% best matched cases in terms of their pre-independence RMSPE. The
bottom figure includes only those cases for which the pre-independence RMSPE falls within the data-
driven caliper cut-off amounting to 0.5 times the samplewide standard deviation in pre-independence
RMSPE.
63
Figure A4: Matching quality: post- versus pre-independence Ukraine
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Note: The figure plots the distribution of the yearly discrepancy in per capita GDP between
Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine in the 1981-1990 period. The Ukranian independence dividend
estimate pertaining to the first post-independence year is indicated by the vertical black line.
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Figure A5: Cumulative trend difference-in-difference estimates of indepen-
dence dividends at selected time-points
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(a) 1st year after independence.
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(b) 5th year after independence.
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(c) 10th year after independence.
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(d) 30th year after independence.
Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of the country-specific trend difference-in-difference
estimates also reported in table A6, along with their 95% confidence intervals. More specifically, the
horizontal axis indicates the proportion of NICs with a trend-demeaned independence dividend estimate
below the cut-off value indicated on the vertical axis. Estimated independence dividends pertain to the
1st, 5th, 10th and 30th post-independence year respectively.
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Figure A6: Simulation quality: Ukraine versus 153 control countries
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(a) All placebo gaps.
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(b) Placebo gaps within caliper.
Note: The left figure plots the yearly average percentage gap between Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine
(black line) against the yearly average placebo gaps between each of its 153 potential control countries
and their synthetic versions (gray lines). The right panel includes only those potential control countries
for which the pre-independence RMSPE is smaller or equal than the pre-independence RMSPE attained
by synthetic Ukraine. The green line depicts the average placebo gap, along with the 95% confidence
interval. The number of years before (-) or after (+) independence are indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A7: Simulation quality: NICs versus placebo countries
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(a) All cases
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(b) 50% best matched cases
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(c) 25% best matched cases
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(d) 10% best matched cases
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(e) All cases within caliper
Note: This figure plots the yearly average percentage gap between NICs and synthetic NICs (black
dots) against the yearly average percentage placebo gap between their potential control countries and
their synthetic counterparts (grey dots) along with a 95% confidence interval. The number of years
before (-) or after (+) independence are indicated on the horizontal axis. The top-left panel contains all
available cases, subsequent panels include only results of the 50, 25 and 10% best matched NICs, in terms
of their pre-independence RMSPE, and their associated placebo countries. The bottom figure includes
only those NICs (and their associated placebo countries) for which the pre-independence RMSPE falls
within the data-driven caliper cut-off amounting to 0.5 times the samplewide standard deviation in
pre-independence RMSPE.
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Figure A8: Cumulative placebo difference-in-difference estimates of indepen-
dence dividends at selected time-points
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(a) 1st year after independence.
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(b) 5th year after independence.
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(c) 10th year after independence.
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(d) 30th year after independence.
Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of the country-specific placebo difference-in-difference
estimates also reported in table A6, along with their 95% confidence intervals. More specifically, the
horizontal axis indicates the proportion of NICs with a placebo-demeaned independence dividend esti-
mate below the cut-off value indicated on the vertical axis. Estimated independence dividends pertain
to the 1st, 5th, 10th and 30th post-independence year respectively.
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Figure A9: Cumulative triple-difference estimates of independence dividends
at selected time-points
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(a) 1st year after independence.
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(b) 5th year after independence.
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(c) 10th year after independence.
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(d) 30th year after independence.
Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of the country-specific triple-difference estimates
also reported in table A6, along with the 95% confidence interval. More specifically, the horizontal axis
indicates the proportion of NICs with a trend- and placebo-demeaned independence dividend estimate
below the cut-off displayed on the vertical axis. Estimated independence dividends pertain to the 1st,
5th, 10th and 30th post-independence year respectively.
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Figure A10: Determinants of the raw independence dividend
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(i) Years-of-independence fixed effects
Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the raw independence dividend (black
line) against their sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are plotted in gray. For
reference, the bottom row plots the region, year and years-of-independence fixed effects: region fixed effects are relative to Europe & Central Asia; year fixed effects are relative
to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are relative to the year of independence.The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A11: Determinants of the trend-demeaned independence dividend
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(i) Years-of-independence fixed effects
Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the trend-demeaned independence
dividend (black line) against their sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are
plotted in gray. For reference, the bottom row plots the region, year and years-of-independence fixed effects: region fixed effects are relative to Europe & Central Asia; year fixed
effects are relative to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are relative to the year of independence.The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A12: Determinants of the placebo-demeaned independence dividend
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(i) Years-of-independence fixed effects
Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the placebo-demeaned independence
dividend (black line) against their sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are
plotted in gray. For reference, the bottom row plots the region, year and years-of-independence fixed effects: region fixed effects are relative to Europe & Central Asia; year fixed
effects are relative to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are relative to the year of independence.The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A13: Determinants of the triple-differenced independence dividend: robustness (1)
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Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the triple-differenced independence dividend (black line) against their
sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are plotted in gray. For reference, the bottom row plots the region, year and
years-of-independence fixed effects: region fixed effects are relative to Europe & Central Asia; year fixed effects are relative to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are relative to the year of independence.The
number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A14: Determinants of the triple-differenced independence dividend: robustness (2)
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(a) Surface area
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(b) Surface area loss
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(c) Trade openness
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(d) Battle deaths
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(e) Democracy
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(f) Macroeconomic uncertainty
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(g) Matching quality
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(h) Simulation quality
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
East Asia South America North Africa South Asia Sub-Sahara Africa
Region
(i) Region FE
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
(j) Year FE
-
1
.
5
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
0 10 20 30
Years of independence
(k) Years-of-independence FE
Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the triple-differenced independence dividend (black line) against their
sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are plotted in gray. For reference, the bottom row plots the region, year and
years-of-independence fixed effects: region fixed effects are relative to Europe & Central Asia; year fixed effects are relative to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are relative to the year of independence.The
number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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Figure A15: Determinants of the triple-differenced independence dividend: robustness (3)
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Note: The top and the middle row plot yearly estimates of the relative importance, as defined in equation 15, of several determinants of the triple-differenced independence
dividend (black line) against their sample-average values (red lines). 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, clustered at the country level and based on 250 replications, are
plotted in gray. For reference, the bottom row plots year and years-of-independence fixed effects: year fixed effects are relative to 1980; years-of-independence fixed effects are
relative to the year of independence. Country fixed effects are included but not shown. The number of years after secession is indicated on the horizontal axis.
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